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Compared to the astonishing growth of the Chinese economy in the last 40 years, the development 
of its capital markets has been lagging behind. Now that the economic system is transforming from 
an export-based and investment-driven model to a consumption-based and innovation-driven one, 
an efficient stock market has never been more relevant. To promote the development of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has implemented a range of new policies in the last decade. One 
of these policies aims at increasing the presence of foreign institutional investors. The objective of 
this thesis is therefore to analyse if the new influx of foreign investors have performed a monitoring 
role and improved firm-level corporate governance structures. More specifically, we hypothesise 
that larger and long-term foreign institutional investments drive corporate governance 
improvements. We have collected an extensive foreign ownership database and used multiple 
metrics to measure firm-level corporate governance. Namely, we use a corporate governance index, 
a transparency disclosure rating, and individual corporate governance attributes. In order to 
alleviate endogeneity concerns, we performed a variety of empirical tests, such as analysing the 
effect of lagged, significant changes in foreign ownership on the level of corporate governance. 
We indeed found that foreign institutional investors have enhanced the development of corporate 
governance mechanisms in Chinese publicly listed firms. Therefore, our results indicate that further 
relaxations in foreign ownership restrictions will hasten the development of the Chinese capital 
markets.  
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Many authors have argued that sound corporate governance structures are beneficial for 
individual firms, financial markets, and countries as a whole (Jesover and Kirkpatrick 2005; 
Claessens and Yurtoglu 2012; Wurgler 2000). Claessens (2006) states that good corporate 
governance can lead to lower costs of capital, higher returns on equity, higher efficiency, and better 
treatment of all involved stakeholders. An inefficient stock market, characterized by low levels of 
corporate governance, might hinder economic growth (Maher and Andersson 2000). In the case of 
China, past economic growth depended to a large extent on state-owned banks financing state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), which was made possible by China’s large base of domestic deposits 
(ASIFMA 2017). However, China’s economic development is entering a new stage where export 
and investments are being replaced by consumption and innovation (Allen, Qian and Gu 2017). In 
order to support this transition, China’s financial model will need to evolve (ASIFMA 2017). Well-
developed capital markets can play an important role here by optimising resource allocation, 
expanding financial channels for enterprises, and providing investment opportunities for the 
Chinese population (Cheng and Li 2015). Moreover, the effects of Chinese capital markets’ 
progress span further than just the Chinese economy. Since 2007, China has been the greatest 
contributor to the growth of the world economy (World Bank (a) 2019). The development of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) will consequently be an 
important factor in the future development of the world economy (Carpenter, Lu and Whitelaw 
2015). 
Unlike the tremendous economic growth that China has reached in the last four decades, its 
stock markets have not kept pace. One factor that has slowed down their development is corporate 
governance related issues. There is a significant amount of academic research covering the high 
levels of corporate fraud (Jia, Ding, Li, and Wu 2009; Chen, Gao, Firth, and Rui 2005), earnings 
management (Qiao, Bin and Qian 2006; Liu and Lu 2007), and expropriation of minority 
shareholders (Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and Lu 2008 ; Gao and Kling 2008). In order to 
alleviate these issues, and to promote sound development of the capital markets, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has implemented a wide array of new regulations in 
the last decade. First, significant changes have been made to the securities law, company law, and 
accounting standards (Keay and Zhao 2018). Second, a Corporate Governance Code, which 
 2 
 
follows the principles established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), was implemented in 2001 (OECD 2011). Third, the CSRC has stepped up 
oversight of publicly listed-firms and has amplified the potential enforcement actions available to 
punish non-compliant firms (Feinerman 2007). Nonetheless, there are still issues related to weak 
corporate governance, limited transparency, soft law enforcement, and weak auditing and 
accounting standards (ASIFMA 2017). As a consequence, many leading Chinese firms, such as 
Tencent, Xiaomi, Alibaba, and Meituan, have decided to list on foreign stock exchanges (The 
Economist 2019). 
Researchers have often put foreign investors forward as a means of improving the level of 
corporate governance, and the overall development of capital markets (Gillan and Starks 2003). In 
line with its WTO entrance conditions, China opened up its financial markets to foreign investors 
in 2006 through the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, Notice of China Securities Regulatory Commission on the Relevant 
Issues Concerning the Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment within the 
Territory of China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 2006). In the last decade, the CSRC 
has reduced the limitations of the QFII program, and has put new methods in place to increase the 
level of foreign ownership. There are currently three ways for foreign investors to invest directly 
into the SSE and the SZSE. The first option is through the QFII and Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (RQFII) programs, which differ only slightly. The QFII program allows 
foreign investors to invest in China with USD and other foreign currencies, while the RQFII 
program allows foreign investors to utilise offshore RMB funds (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
Comparing Stock Connect with QFII/RQFII 2015). The second option is a strategic investment, 
which is more appropriate for foreign public and private companies. The final options is through 
one of the Connect programs. The first links both the SZSE and SSE to the Hong Kong Exchange 
(HKEX). The second links the SSE to the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The Connect program 
with HKEX has been up and running since November 2014 and is showing great potential (Yiu 
2017). The Connect program with LSE has only started recently and is still quite limited in scope. 
By allowing more foreign investments into the capital markets, the CSRC aims to strengthen 
the corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese firms (CSRC 2016). Foreign institutional 
investors might be able to improve firm-level corporate governance through both public and 
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private channels, by respectively initiating shareholder activism cases or entering into private 
dialogues with the firm. The objective of this paper is therefore to see if the new influx of foreign 
institutional investors, mostly through the QFII/RQFII and Connect programs,  has improved the 
level of corporate governance of Chinese publicly listed firms. A subsequent improvement in 
corporate governance could be beneficial for firm-level performance, the overall development of 
the Chinese capital markets, and the growth level of the real economy.  
In order to demonstrate this, we collect an extensive database on foreign ownership between 
2005 and 2017 by manually collecting ownership data from the FactSet database. Next, we use 
different metrics to capture the level of corporate governance. Firstly, we use a corporate 
governance index consisting out of 19 individual attributes. Secondly, we use a Transparency 
Disclosure Index, compiled by the SZSE. Thirdly, we use certain important individual corporate 
governance attributes as dependent variables as well. We then use a variety of empirical 
methodologies to alleviate concerns, such as endogeneity, as best as possible. Firstly, we measure 
the effect of lagged and significant changes in foreign ownership on the current level of corporate 
governance. Secondly, we perform multiple logistic regressions to analyse the effect of lagged 
ownership levels on corporate governance outcomes. Thirdly, we include several robustness tests 
to support our findings. Finally, we perform a qualitative study by collecting activism shareholder 
and engagement cases to prove that institutional investors are able to effectively influence Chinese 
companies in practice. Our results indeed show that foreign institutional investors have 
strengthened firm-level corporate governance.  
Apart from Tan (2009), who performs a qualitative study by interviewing nine QFIIs, and Zhu 
and Huang (2015), who specifically looks at the effect of QFIIs on the split-share structure reform 
process, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to prove that foreign investors have 
enhanced the corporate governance structures of Chinese public firms. Our results thus contribute 
to the stream of research that promotes an important monitoring role for foreign investors. In terms 
of proposed policy changes, our findings suggest that a reduction in the current limitations to 
foreign investors will lead to more sound corporate governance mechanisms and a faster 
development of the Chinese capital markets. Better functioning capital markets can play an 
important role in supporting economic growth, productivity increases, and innovation, which in 
turn will lead to increases in the standard of living of the Chinese population. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 consists of an extensive literature review where we 
cover four topics: the Chinese financial markets, the evolution of Chinese corporate governance, 
Chinese foreign investments and its regulation, and the effect of foreign investors on corporate 
governance. Section 3 presents our hypothesis in more detail. Section 4 describes the foreign 
ownership variables, corporate governance metrics, and other control variables in more depth. 
Sections 5 and 6 cover our methodologies and results. Section 7 provides our conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1.Chinese Market overview 
The creation of the stock exchanges was an important part of the economic reforms of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The original objective of the SSE and SZSE, founded 
respectively in 1990 and 1991, was to privatize large SOEs. SOEs play a dominant role in the 
Chinese economy in areas such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, and industrial and 
technical equipment. However, economic reforms were necessary as, in the 1990s, one third of the 
SOEs were losing money and struggling under high levels of debt (Huang and Yeung 2014). In 
addition, a high proportion of the loans issued to the SOEs were considered non-performing, which 
was putting a heavy strain on the Chinese banking system. The share of non-performing loans 
issued to SOEs was equal to 25% in 1991 (Bartel and Huang 2000). In sum, according to Huang 
and Yeung (2014), the privatization had four important functions. Firstly, to let the financial 
markets lower the financing burdens of the state financial departments and banks. Secondly, to 
lower the government presence in the management of enterprises. Thirdly, to allow self-
determination for companies. Finally, to channel more savings into the accumulation of social 
capital.  
2.1.1. Early stage development 
The development of the Chinese financial markets has been lagging behind compared to its 
real economic growth (Allen et al. 2017). The average ratio of market capitalization to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) between 2007 and 2017 was equal to 58.57%, compared to respectively 
125.05% and 110.39% for the United States and the United Kingdom (World Bank(b) 2019). In 
January 2016, the CRSC’s chairman, Xiao Gang, characterized the Chinese market as an 
“immature market with inexperienced investors, an imperfect trading system, and an inappropriate 
supervisory system” (2016). Indeed, Bayraktar’s research (2014) on the development of global 
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stock markets showed that there was still a big discrepancy between the current level of the Chinese 
stock market and its potential capacity. The importance of a well-functioning stock market cannot 
be underestimated. Financial markets promote modern enterprise systems, more optimal resource 
allocation, and facilitate economic growth. In addition, an efficient stock market could play an 
important role in alleviating the burden of the current high levels of Chinese corporate and state 
debt by providing alternative financing channels (China Power Team 2019).  
There are several reasons why the Chinese capital markets have not yet reached their full 
potential. A first reason is the Chinese political context. When the stock exchanges were created, 
there was a certain level of skepticism within the central government of the PRC. This skepticism 
was well put by Deng Xiaoping, one of China’s most famous leaders, in 1992: “Securities, stock 
markets, are they good or evil? Are they dangerous or safe? Are they unique to capitalism or also 
applicable to socialism? Let us try and see. If it goes well, we can relax control; if it goes badly, 
we can correct or close it.” (Huang and Yeung 2014). Due to this sentiment of doubt, the Chinese 
government opted to implement the privatization process gradually, and to maintain controlling 
rights in important SOEs. Consequently, a large portion of the shares of publicly listed companies 
was retained by the state or other legal persons in the form of non-tradable shares. 
The valuation of non-tradable shares is based on Net Asset Value (NAV) mechanisms, which 
often leads to a distorted value compared to the stock price of the tradable shares. The subsequent 
lack of alignment between the shareholders of tradable and non-tradable shares was often the cause 
of poor corporate governance structures, and bad corporate performance (Yang, Hou and Qian 
2015). By 2005, the portion of tradable shares was only 41.66% (Jiang and Kim 2015). According 
to Cheng and Li (2015), the non-tradable shares slowed down the development of the financial 
markets and had a hindering effect on the management reform of state-owned companies. After 
multiple attempts by the Chinese government to decrease the level of non-tradable shares, the split-
share-structure reform was finally put in place in 2005. It is considered the second wave of 
privatization and the most important reform of the Chinese financial markets since its foundation 
(Zhu and Huang 2015).  
A second reason why the Chinese financial markets have struggled to develop is the central 
role of the banking industry within the financial system. Five banks, which are all majority-owned 
by the government, dominate the banking industry, and account for almost half of the total loan 
 6 
 
market (Elliott and Yan 2013). Between 1992 and 2003, the average ratio of domestically raised 
capital to the amount of bank loans was equal to 5.77% (Wong 2006). In addition, the Chinese 
financial system is characterized by a sizeable shadow-banking sector. As shadow-banks operate 
under a reduced level of regulatory oversight, they are able to compete in capital markets by 
providing cheap and more widely available financial services (Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao 2015). 
Thirdly, individual investors, who lack the expertise of institutional investors in pricing efficiency, 
dominate the Chinese capital markets. In fact, China has the largest number of individual investors 
in the world, with over 90 million people investing actively in shares and bonds (CSRC 2014). 
Finally, the IPO process is based on an approval system where the Government plays a dominant 
role in identifying sectors of interest, establishing a quota system and even determining the offer 
price. Consequently, SOEs are often favoured over private companies (Jiang and Kim 2015).  
2.1.2. More recent developments 
Many changes have been implemented in the last decade in an attempt to modernize and further 
develop the capital markets. Firstly, the split-share-structure reform has reduced agency problems 
between non-tradable and tradable shareholders, and improved the price discovery process and 
liquidity of shares (Jiang and Kim 2015). Secondly, CSRC has been promoting the development 
of a variety of institutional investors, including, but not limited to, pensions funds (China Daily 
2017), insurance companies (ASIFMA 2017), venture capital (Yue 2016), and private equity 
(Yang 2018). In addition, under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) program, 
domestic institutional investors are able to invest abroad and further develop their expertise. 
Thirdly, the offer of investment tools has increased significantly by including futures, and allowing 
margin trading, and short selling. Finally, the IPO process is getting more streamlined with the 
objective of ultimately transforming into a registration-based system (Zhang 2019). Carpenter et 
al. (2015) find evidence that these policy changes have yielded results. Their results show that the 
Chinese stock markets have become as informative about future corporate profits as American 
stock markets. 
Currently, there are 1,479 companies listed on the SSE and 2,170 companies on SZSE1. The 
SSE consists mainly of large, and often state-owned, enterprises in industries such as Real Estate, 
 




Finance, Resources, and Energy, while the SZSE consists more out of small-and-medium sized, 
innovative, and technology companies. To adhere to the specific needs of different sized 
companies, the SZSE has transformed into a multi-tier market system consisting out of three 
different components: Main Board, SME Board and ChiNext. The SME Board and ChiNext are 
important financing channels for respectively companies in a transitional phase, and innovative or 
emerging companies (Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2011).  In addition, the CSRC founded the 
National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ) in 2012. The NEEQ, an over-the-counter 
market, has the objective of making financing more accessible to smaller companies, which often 
have difficulties obtaining favourable bank loans and have limited access to capital markets (F&Y 
Capital 2015). 
In sum, the Chinese capital markets still have significant steps to take if they want to reach 
their full potential and have a stature on the world stage similar to the real Chinese economy. 
Nonetheless, the fact that they will play an important role in the future of capital raising is 
indisputable. This view is shared by a survey of the Economist Intelligence Unit (2018) predicting 
that China will be the country with the most issuers by 2030. In addition, the announcement of 
MSCI in 2017 to further the integration of the Chinese stock exchanges into its MSCI Emerging 
Market Index sends a signal that China is well on its way (He and Ka-Sing 2017).  
2.2.Chinese Corporate Governance 
The quality of the corporate governance level of a country`s stock market and its constituents 
have important consequences for the growth of the real economy, the allocation of resources, and 
the level of affordable foreign and domestic capital. Corporate governance can help companies 
operate more efficiently, gain access to capital, and prevent mismanagement and corruption 
(Hartzler 2011). The development of corporate governance in Chinese publicly listed firms has 
been well covered academically since the inception of the financial markets (Clarke 2003; Liu 
2006; Yang, Chi and Young 2011; Jiang & Kim 2015; Mutlu, Van Essen, Peng, Saleh, Durane 
2018). Bearing in mind the age of the two stock exchanges, Chinese corporate governance has 
made significant strides over the last three decades. Nonetheless, there is still room for 
improvement in a series of matters. This section covers the development of the internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms, some of the most pressing corporate governance 
issues, and the development of the regulatory framework in the Chinese financial markets. 
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2.2.1. Internal Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance issues in the early stages of the stock market were mostly related to the 
disproportionate presence of SOEs and concentrated government ownership. A 2003 Corporate 
Governance report by the SSE showed that in 40.9% of the SOEs, the government owned more 
than 50% of total shares (Tan and Wang 2007). The first issue concerning high levels of state 
ownership is that their primary objective is not maximising shareholder value. Other aims such as 
maintaining employment and social stability, keeping control over important strategic sectors, and 
politically motivated job placement might outweigh the objectives of shareholders (Liu 2006). 
Next, the government is the institution that oversees market regulation and corporate governance 
guidelines on one hand, and a major shareholder in many listed companies on the other hand. Stulz 
(2005) defines this issue as a “twin-agency” problem. Thirdly, Clarke (2003) posits that 
government ownership leads to an absence of an effective ultimate principal. Since the population, 
the ultimate beneficiary of all government ownership, has no incentive or means to monitor, there 
is a lack of a principal agent controlling the management. Next, the non-tradable shares owned by 
both the government and other legal persons do not share in the profits of stock price increases. 
This can cause serious incentive alignment issues. Finally, even in non-SOEs, the state might still 
be able to influence companies through politically-connected board members and executives. In 
line with this, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) find that board structures of firms with politically 
connected CEOs have fewer directors with an academic background, more current or ex-
government members, and older directors. Next, Schweizer, Walker and Zhang (2017) find that 
politically-connected private enterprises are able to obtain corporate bonds more easily and at 
lower financing rates. In addition, the results of Schweizer, Walker and Zhang (2019) show that 
the presence of politically-connected managers increases the likelihood of completing a cross-
border merger or acquisition. 
In short, the early corporate governance system in China could be defined as control-based, 
where the controlling shareholder, often the state, has a tight grip over the governance of the firm, 
instead of a market-based system (Liu 2006). The non-tradable share reform of 2005 ushered in a 
new period for the development of corporate governance. The control-based corporate governance 
system has been transforming into a hybrid model characterized by both economic and 
administrative measures (Keay and Zhao 2018). Nonetheless, frictions between controlling 
shareholders, both private and state, and minority shareholders remain. Although some authors, 
 9 
 
such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Vishny and Schleifer (1986), argue that controlling 
shareholders can be a valuable tool in reducing agency problems; this often is not the case in 
emerging markets. Indeed, Chen, Li and Shapiro (2011) put controlling-shareholder expropriation 
forward as the most pressing issue in China and other emerging economies. Jiang, Lee and Yue 
(2010) find an excessive use of corporate loans by controlling shareholders so as to expropriate 
wealth from the firm and minority shareholders. The empirical results of Liu and Lu (2007) show 
that a large share of earnings management is caused by the agency conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders. Much additional research has been given to the analysis of tunneling 
and earnings management issues (Lo, Wong and Firth 2010; Berkman, Cole, Cole and Fu 2009; 
Jiang, Zhu and Huang 2013; Shan 2013).  
Other issues include the ineffectiveness of supervisory boards and the limited power of 
independent directors. Laura Cha, the previous vice-chairman of the CSRC stated that 
“supervisory boards may give the illusion of certain checks and balances in the listed companies, 
when none existed” (2001). Xi (2006) supports this claim by stating that supervisory boards suffer 
from a lack of information, legal support, and expertise. Their inability to vote on board of 
directors’ decisions and to elect board members was considered the most pressing issue. The 2006 
amendements to the Company law tackled many of the aforementioned issues and thus improved 
the monitoring effectiveness of the supervisory boards (Ding, Jia, Li and Wu 2010). Consistent 
with this, recent research has brought forward more positive results on supervisory boards (Ding, 
Jia, Li and Wu 2009; Firth, Fung and Rui 2007; Haß, Johan and Schweizer 2016).  
In any case, according to a source within the CSRC, the idea of independent directors was 
pushed forward as supervisory boards were deemed useless at the time (Andrews and Tomasic 
2006). The Guidelines for introducing independent directors to the board of directors of listed 
companies  state that, starting in 2003, at least one third of the board of directors needs to be 
independent. Research on the effectiveness of independent directors has shown mixed results. 
Three reasons have been presented to explain the potential ineffectiveness of independent directors 
(Tan and Wang 2007). Firstly, most boards of directors still only have a minority of independent 
directors, which might impede their monitoring function. Secondly, a large number of independent 
directors are directly chosen by the controlling shareholder, which undermines their independence. 
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Thirdly, the authors claim that the reputational motivation mechanism2 for independent directors 
has yet to take off in China. Nonetheless, more recent research by Khanna and Ma (2016) and 
Jiang, Wan and Zhao (2016) found more promising results on the effectiveness of independent 
directors. 
2.2.2. External Corporate Governance  
Analogous to the situation of internal corporate governance, the external corporate governance 
systems have improved significantly over time, but certain issues still remain. Firstly, the legal 
environment is still quite weak compared to more developed economies. Allen, Qian and Qian 
(2005) extended the study of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) by calculating the 
respective corporate governance metrics for China. They find that China scores significantly lower 
than most countries in areas such as law enforcement, corruption, and shareholder protection. The 
authors mention the lack of sufficient legal professionals as an important issue as well. Jiang and 
Kim (2015) supplement this point of view by not only stating that law enforcement is below 
average, but that fines are often too low to make an impact. For example, Danhua Chemical 
Technology was found guilty of hiding related-party transactions worth 1.5 billion RMB (210 
million USD), and of making up false bank deposits and capital worth 700 million RMB (99.28 
million USD) between 2003 and 2006. The firm got off with a warning and a fine of 300,000 RMB 
(42,548 USD). In short, the legal cost of committing fraud is low. 
Secondly, due to their relatively low levels of shareholding and short-term horizons, Chinese 
institutional investors are not considered effective monitors (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Aggarwal, Hu 
and Yang (2015) find mixed results when analysing the monitoring effect of domestic institutional 
investors in preventing fraud between 2001 and 2011. They find that institutions that are more 
likely to have business ties with firms (e.g. insurance companies, pensions funds, trusts, etc.) play 
no significant monitoring role, while they do find a positive monitoring effect from domestic 
mutual funds. Firth, Gao, Shen and Zhang (2016) further support this conclusion by finding a 
significant effect of mutual fund ownership on the level of dividend pay-outs. They do not find 
any significant either for other institutional investors.  
 
2 In more developed markets, an independent director is incentivized to properly fulfill its monitoring role as 
companies are looking for effective independent directors. The value of “good” independent directors will therefore 
increase, which in turn will lead to more and better paid independent director positions. 
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Thirdly, the corporate control market is underdeveloped. An active corporate control market 
can be an effective corporate governance tool. Managers of firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms are likely to lose their jobs, once the firm is taken over. Jiang and Kim (2015) suggest 
three reasons why there is no active corporate control market in China. First, the government will 
not easily sell off SOEs. Second, for non-SOEs, ownership is often too concentrated to permit a 
hostile take-over. Third, directors of target firms are often unwilling to sell the firm. Li and Qian 
(2012) find proof that a hostile take-over is less likely for firms where the controlling shareholder 
holds large shares of the ownership. They find as well that politically-connected CEOs have a 
positive effect on hostile take-overs. The authors argue that these CEOs are more interested in 
advancing on the political scale than in representing the interests of the controlling shareholder. 
Finally, debt is not considered an effective control mechanism as, even though bankruptcy laws 
exist, the Government will often intervene for SOEs and large firms, in order to keep employment 
and social stability secure. However, more recently several SOEs have been declared bankrupt by 
Chinese courts, such as Guangxi Nonferrous metals Group in 2016 (Durden 2016). 
2.2.3. Corporate Governance regulation  
Finally, we take look at the most important regulatory changes in the last three decades. Figure 
1  gives an overview of the most important regulatory changes since the inception of the stock 
exchanges. Overall, the Chinese government and the CSRC have proven that they are capable of 
changing and implementing new regulations if necessary. In the last few years, the CSRC has 
made significant adjustments to the Company Law, Securities Law, and Accounting Standards, in 
order to improve the regulatory framework. For example, cumulative voting, mandatory disclosure 
of internal control reports, and stricter minority shareholder protection were implemented in the 
last decade. The most significant regulatory change regarding corporate governance was the 
implementation of the Corporate Governance Code in 2001. The Corporate Governance Code was 
enacted by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) (abolished in 2003) and the CSRC. 
Since both agencies were ministerial-level agencies, the Code is a “ministerial rule” and thus a 
formal part of Chinese law.  
However, according to Xi and Chen (2014), there is still a certain level of ambiguity on the 
enforceability of the Corporate Governance Code, both from a public and private perspective. 
Originally, the CSRC only had the authority to request changes in the articles of association or 
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corporate governance by-laws. No warnings, monetary fines, or industry bans were available to 
the CSRC to reprimand non-compliers. The potential repercussions of ignoring the CSRC’s 
request to improve corporate governance structures were not clear either. In short, the legal 
framework and enforcement mechanisms around the Corporate Governance Code were rather soft 
in nature. In 2007, a campaign was started to increase the enforceability of the Corporate 
Governance Code. Firstly, the CSRC’s toolbox to intervene was significantly increased. The new 
measures included private conversations with the company’s chairman and top executives, formal 
warnings, formal criticisms, and notifications to the local government or sector regulator. 
Secondly, the CSRC’s review of certain corporate actions such as seasoned equity offerings, 
mergers and acquisitions, etc. could become more stringent if a firm was non-compliant with the 
Corporate Governance Code. On the other hand, private enforcement of the Corporate Governance 
Code is uncommon as well. A specific clause that clarifies the possible enforcement actions for 
private parties against non-compliance does not exist.  
In conclusion, the most pressing corporate governance issues in Chinese publicly listed firms 
are agency problems between controlling shareholders, private or state, and minority shareholders; 
a lack of monitoring by supervisory boards, institutional investors, and independent directors; a 
weak legal environment and enforcement; and no active corporate control market. Nonetheless, 
more recently, the Chinese stock exchanges and CSRC have taken an active stance in improving 
the regulatory framework and corporate governance mechanisms (Figure 1). 
2.3.Foreign investments 
Since 1978, China has been gradually opening up its economy to foreign investors. The main reason 
for this moderate approach has been the synchronisation of opening up, with the overall development of 
the economy and its institutional capacities (World Bank 2010). Over time, China has introduced many 
initiatives to modernise the economic institutions and to stimulate investments. Special Economic Zones, 
with favourable trade and tax policies, have been launched in multiple provinces and cities (Ye 2009). In 
addition, investment guides and “negative lists” have been introduced in order to guide and restrict foreign 
investments into certain industries (Huang 2003). Especially since 2015, China’s foreign investment policy 
has become significantly more lenient due to low foreign exchange reserves. Its policy can currently be 
characterized as “control the capital flight and encourage capital inflows”3. In this light, in August 2017, 
the State council promulgated the Notice of state council on several measures to promote foreign investment 
 
3 According to the person responsible for foreign investments in Sichuan province (personal interview). 
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growth (guofa nr.39) in order to reduce restrictions on foreign investments significantly4. All these 
measurements have made China one of the most popular FDI destinations in the world (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2017). On the other hand, foreign investors’ access to the Chinese capital markets has been more 
regulated and limited. As China’s WTO accession required it to open up its capital markets by 2006, new 
programs and regulations were accordingly put in place (Li, Tam, Yu and Zhang 2010). 
2.3.1. Foreign access at the early stages 
Since the inception of the Chinese stock exchanges, foreign investors have been able to invest 
in selected Chinese companies through certain types of shares. B-shares are shares issued on the 
SSE or SZSE, and are denominated in respectively USD and HKD. There are currently around 48 
B-share listings on the SZSE and 50 on the SSE of which the last ones were listed in 20005. 
Originally, B-shares were only available to foreign investors. As there were severe liquidity issues, 
high information asymmetry, and large price discounts compared to their respective A-shares, 
domestic investors were also allowed to buy B-shares as of 2001 (Chan, Menkveld and Yang 
2008). Other than B-shares, there are more types of shares for Chinese companies outside 
Mainland China. H-shares, P-Chips, and Red-Chips are shares of Chinese companies that are listed 
on the HKEX. The main differences among them is that H-share companies are incorporated in 
Mainland China, while Red Chips and P-Chips companies are incorporated outside China. Red-
Chips have a government ownership level of at least 35% while this is not the case for P-Chips 
(FTSE Russel 2019). There are approximately 270 H-shares and 170 P-chips and Red-Chips 
combined in the Hong Kong market (Hong Kong Stock Exchange 2019). Additionally, Chinese 
companies are able to issue S-shares (Singapore), N-shares (New York), L-shares (London), F-
shares (Frankfurt) and Depositary Receipts on other markets.  
Even though these shares enable investors to get exposure to certain Chinese companies and 
industries, it does not allow them access to the Chinese stock market. Currently there are three 
different methods for foreign investors to invest directly in Chinese financial markets: the QFII 
and RQFII programs, strategic investments, and the Connect programs with the London and Hong 
Kong Exchanges (Shao, Feng and Niu 2018). Depending on the type of investment and investor, 
one of the three investment methods is the most fitting. The QFII and RQFII programs are more 
 
4 Ibid. 
5 According to the Shanghai and Shenzhen websites. As data is often outdated on the English version of these websites, 
the amount of B-shares might deviate slightly from this number.  
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appropriate for larger investment firms who want to include Chinese publicly listed firms in their 
portfolio. Strategic investments are mainly for public and private companies which want to obtain 
a significant share for a long-term horizon. The Connect programs are financial institutions 
needing more liquidity and flexibility than larger financial funds. Nonetheless, a survey by the 
Asian Corporate Governance Association (2017) showed that 46% of foreign institutional 
investors use both the QFII/RQFII programs and the Stock Connect programs to invest in China. 
All investments are still limited to the Catalogue of industries for guiding foreign investments and 
Special administrative measures for foreign investment access (negative list) which set out for 
investors the encouraged, restricted, and forbidden industries.  
2.3.2. QFII and RQFII program 
The QFII program was brought forward in 2002 and was officially implemented in 2006. Tam 
et al. (2010) argue that the Chinese government and CSRC aim to use the experience of large 
foreign investors to raise standards and stabilize the Chinese financial markets. The Measures for 
the Administration of Securities Investment in China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
outlines the regulations and requirements for QFII members. The first version was adopted on the 
1st of September 2006 and was later relaxed in 2012. Table 1 gives an overview of the criteria, in 
terms of size and experience, which the applicant needs to meet in order to apply for the QFII 
license. In addition, the CSRC must have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
securities regulatory institution of the respective foreign investor’s country6. Figure 2 shows that 
the 2012 relaxations had a significant effect on the investments made under the QFII program. 
Between 2003 and 2011, the total quota grew from 1.7 Billion USD to 37.44 Billion USD, while, 
between 2012 and 2017, the quota more than doubled to 93.07 Billion USD. By September 2018, 
the total approved quota reached 100 Billion USD (Shen 2019).  
Once a foreign investor obtains a QFII license, certain limitations still apply. Firstly, an 
individual QFII can only own a maximum of 20% of a single stock, while the sum of total QFII 
ownership cannot be larger than 30%. Secondly, the original lock-up period of one year was 
changed to three months in 2016 and was completely lifted in June 2018. For repatriation of profits, 
a monthly limit of 20% of the previous year’s total onshore assets was also abolished in June 2018 
 
6 Table 2 gives an overview of all countries that signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the CSRC. 
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(Man 2018). These two modifications were important for foreign investors as this has given them 
more liquidity and flexibility. Restrictions on asset allocation and hedging foreign currencies have 
been lifted as well. Before 2016, financial institutions needed to allocate at least 50% into equity 
products and no more than 20% into money market products (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission 2016). In addition, foreign investors are able to hedge their currency risk onshore as 
well since June 2018 (Man 2018). This is a significant step as previously they were only able to 
do this with RMB outside of mainland China. Overall, most restrictions of the QFII program are 
being relaxed or abolished in order to stay competitive with the Connect programs. 
The RQFII program was initiated in 2013. The main difference between the QFII and RQFII 
programs is the currency that financial institutions use for their investments in the Chinese market. 
QFIIs use USD or other foreign currencies, while RQFIIs use overseas RMB funds. The RQFII 
program therefore helps for the internationalization of the RMB currency. The eligibility criteria 
for RQFII applicants are less strict but are limited to certain countries. In order to apply for an 
RQFII license, the applicant must be the subsidiary of a mainland Chinese company in Hong Kong 
(or another pilot area) or be a financial institution whose headquarters are located in Hong Kong 
(or another pilot area). At present, the CSRC has selected 19 countries to participate in the RQFII 
program7. Unlike QFIIs, RQFIIs have no individual investment quotas. Instead, the quota is given 
to the respective country as a whole. Currently, Hong Kong, the United States and Japan have the 
highest quotas with respectively 500, 250 and 200 million RMB (70.8, 35.4 and 28.32 million 
USD). The regulations and limits of RQFII are similar to the QFII program. 
2.3.3. Strategic investments and the Connect programs 
Strategic investments differ from the QFII and RQFII program in terms of investor type, 
investment size, and horizon. The Administrative measures on the strategic investments in listed 
companies by foreign investors dictates that investments, depending on the industry, need to be 
larger than 10% of the total outstanding shares and need to be for a minimum of three years (Art.5 
2/3). Nonetheless, in practice the rules often are not strictly implemented8. Strategic investors are 
most often private or public companies, or venture capital and private equity firms. The original 
 
7 Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, UK, Australia, United States, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Canada, 
Switzerland, Malaysia, Thailand, Ireland, Japan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Hungary and Chile. 
8 Ibid 3. 
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criteria for a strategic investor were 100 Million USD in real assets or 500 Million USD in assets 
under management. As of August 2018, these criteria apply only when the investor becomes the 
controlling shareholder. If this is not the case, the real assets or assets under management need to 
be at least respectively 50 Million USD or 300 Million USD (Guo and Boitout 2018). For strategic 
investments, approval of both the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the CSRC are necessary.  
There are currently two Connect programs through which foreign investors have a limited 
access to the SSE and SZSE. The most significant ones are the SSE-HKEX and SZSE-HKEX 
Connect programs, which were initiated in November 2014 (Hong Kong Stock Exchange 2019). 
The CSRC (2014) defines the Stock Connect program with Hong Kong as “A mutual market 
access mechanism between the Shanghai/Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock exchanges which enable 
investors in mainland and Hong Kong to trade shares listed on the other exchange’s market within 
scope”. This scope is limited to the constituents of the SSE 180 Index and the SSE 380 Index for 
the SSE, and the constituents of the SZSE Component Index and the SZSE Small/Mid Innovation 
index for the SZSE. Since there are no criteria to use the connect program, it has gained a lot of 
popularity compared to the QFII and RQFII programs (Yiu 2016).The SSE-LSE Connect program 
is less developed and more recent. Only a certain number of eligible stocks, mostly of reputable 
companies, will be listed on each other’s exchanges to allow their investors to get more exposure 
to the respective markets.  
2.4.Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance 
Khan and Banerji (2016) argue that foreign investments can be both the cause and the effect 
of corporate governance improvements. Previous academic research has analysed two facets of the 
relationship between corporate governance and foreign institutional investors. On one hand, 
researchers have investigated if foreign investors use the level of corporate governance as an 
investment criterion. Since foreign investors are at an informational disadvantage, they might 
prefer firms with strong corporate governance to reduce their investment risk (Ahearne, Griever 
and Warnock 2004). On the other hand, researchers have investigated if foreign investors actively 
monitor and attempt to increase the level of corporate governance, once they have invested in the 
company. In short, the first and second stream of research look respectively at the ex-ante 
(Bowman and Min 2015; Luo, Chung and Sobczak 2009; Byun, Eppler-Kim, Kim and Kim 2010; 
Leuz, Lins and Warnock 2009) and ex-post (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos 2011; Khan and 
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Banerji 2016; McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2016) relationship between corporate governance 
and foreign institutional investors.  
2.4.1. Importance of Corporate Governance for foreign investors 
Bowman and Min (2015) argue that the more complex and different the foreign environment 
is from the investor’s home country, in terms of language, culture, and political and regulatory 
framework, the higher the cost linked to foreign investments. Therefore, foreign investors should 
place a lot of importance on the level of corporate governance, as this lowers the level of 
information asymmetry. To test their hypothesis, the authors analyse the effect of independent 
director appoinments on foreign ownership in South-Korean publicly-listed firms. They indeed 
find a positive increase of foreign ownership when outside directors are appointed. They conclude 
by stating that their results propose an effective method to further the process of financial 
globalisation. Byun et al. (2010) conduct the same analysis on the Korean financial markets and 
find similar results. In addition, they find that domestic institutional investors are less sensitive to 
corporate governance issues, which supports the idea that they are less hindered by information 
asymmetry issues. 
As foreign investors often have only a minority stake in foreign firms, they depend more on 
corporate governance as it decreases the costs of monitoring controlling shareholders. This is 
especially the case in China where there are ownership limits for foreign investors. Leuz et al. 
(2008) analyse a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 29 countries, and found indeed that foreign 
investors were less likely to invest in firms with high insider and/or controlling ownership. Mishra 
and Ratti (2011) analysed the importance of corporate governance and ownership structures for 
Chinese companies and found similar results. Their results show that the share of foreign 
ownership is negatively associated with large holdings by legal persons. In addition, they found 
that foreign ownership is positively related to large foreign institutional holdings as well, which 
implies a monitoring function by the latter. In support of this, the results of Tan (2009), who 
performs a qualitative overview by surveying QFIIs, show that foreign QFIIs take into account the 
corporate governance structures of Chinese firms as well. 
2.4.2. Monitoring effect of foreign institutional investors 
There are several ways through which the presence of foreign investors can increase  the level 
of corporate governance of both an individual firm and the overall market. At a firm level, 
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institutional investors can either directly communicate with the management to force a change 
(“voice” or direct intervention) or they can voice their discontent by selling shares (“exit” or 
“voting with their feet”) (McCahery et al. 2016). On a broader level, Richard Ward, the CEO of 
one of the largest Chinese QFII, UBS Warburg, stated that as Chinese companies are now  
competing for capital against their international peers, they will be required to increase their 
corporate governance standards9. Outside China, Aggarwal et al. (2011) take a closer look at the 
behavior of institutional investors in 23 countries between 2003-2008. They find that changes in 
foreign institutional ownership are not only positively associated with firm-level governance 
changes, but as well with the likelihood that poorly performing CEOs are terminated. Mezzanotte 
and  Fung (2018) analyse the voting behavior of institutional behavior on connected transaction 
proposals of Hong Kong-listed firms. They find a significant positive relationship between the 
level of institutional ownership and the level of dissent voting. 
Bena, Ferreira, Matos and Pires (2017) state that, once a foreign investor becomes a 
shareholder, it can either choose to leverage its management and business experience, and improve 
the corporate governance and long-term valuation of the firm, or it can choose to prioritize short-
term profit by selling off assets, increasing dividends, underinvesting in innovation and R&D, 
and/or implementing lay-offs. The latter form of foreign institutional investor has been given the 
label “locust”. Franz Müntefering, formerly a German Social Democratic Party Chairman, first 
coined the term locust. He accused certain foreign private equity companies and activist hedge 
funds of prioritizing short-term profits over the long-term development of a company.  However 
Bena et al. (2017), analyzed a large sample of publicly listed firms in over 30 countries, and found 
a positive relationship between foreign ownership, and long-term investments in tangible, 
intangible and human capital. In addition, they found that foreign institutional ownership increases 
the level of innovation output significantly.  
Zhu and Huang (2015) test the influence of QFIIs in China by examinating the split-share 
structure reform process. In order to come to an agreement, non-tradable shareholders need to offer 
a compensation package to tradable shareholders for the dilution of their share value. As two-thirds 
of tradable shareholders need to agree to the proposal, the process often takes a long time. The 
authors find that the presence of foreign investors shortens the negotiation process and increases 
 
9 UBS Warburg, see “Foreign Investors Embrace QFII”, 26 Nov. 2002 at <http://www.en.chinabroadcast.cn> 
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the compensation for minority shareholders. Aggarwal et al. (2015) research the effect of both 
domestic and foreign institutional investors on the probability of corporate fraud in Chinese firms. 
They find a significant positive monitoring effect of domestic mutual funds. However, they find 
no significant results for both foreign and “grey” institutional investors. Chen, Harford and Li 
(2007) define grey institutional investors as those which are more likely to have business ties with 
the firm, such as insurance companies, pension funds, banks, and trusts. Wu, Johan and Rui (2012) 
also found that domestic mutual funds decrease the likelihood of corporate fraud and thus perform 
a monitoring function, while foreign investors have no effect.  
3. Hypothesis section 
The CSRC stated in 2016 that the QFII and RQFII programs “were bringing in long-term 
foreign capital and improving corporate governance” (China Securities Regulatory Commission 
2019). However, whether or not foreign investors perform a monitoring role and actively pursue 
improvements to corporate governance is still an open question (Bae 2012). The most convincing 
evidence up until now is provided by Aggarwal et al. (2011), who found a positive monitoring 
effect of foreign investors in 23 different countries. However, they mostly consider developed 
economies, which generally already have more sound corporate governance mechanisms. For 
emerging economies, there is overall little evidence that foreign investors perform a monitoring 
role. Shubita and Shubita (2019) found some proof that foreign investors take on monitoring role 
in Jordanian publicly-listed firms, as their presence leads to higher growth and better performance. 
Douma, George and Kabir (2006) found similar results for Indian firms. However, their analyses 
do not take into account that foreign investors might be able to select outperforming firms. On the 
other hand, Phung and Vy (2013) and Ananchotikul (2007) found no monitoring role of foreign 
investors in, respectively, Vietnamese and Thai publicly listed-firms. 
Nonetheless, research from other emerging and developed countries cannot just be 
extrapolated to China. The combination of historically strict rules for foreign investors, and the 
oftentimes weak corporate governance structures in China does not make it evident that foreign 
investors are able to improve corporate governance (Allen and Rui 2018). Foreign investors 
definitely have enough incentive to attempt to improve corporate governance. Firstly, it lowers the 
likelihood of expropriation by controlling shareholders, and fraud (Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui 2006; 
Ding, Jia, et al. 2009; Huyghebaert and Wang 2012). Secondly, more sound corporate governance 
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can lead to better operating performance. Haß et al. (2016) indeed found that firms with higher 
levels of corporate governance have higher performance persistence. They find as well that 
evidence that this increased performance persistence leads to a lower cost of borrowing. Evidence 
that foreign investors are in fact willing to actively engage with Chinese companies is given by 
Allen and Rui (2018). Their survey of 155 institutional investors with experience in China and 
other countries in Asia, shows that 46% of investors actively try to engage with Chinese A-share 
firms.  
Foreign institutional investors have several channels to influence the governance of Chinese 
firms (Ding 2018). Firstly, investors holding at least 3%, individually or as a group, can put 
forward an interim proposal which includes discussion points and matters to be voted on.  
Secondly, investors holding at least 1%, individually or as group, have the right to initiate legal 
action against directors who have breached their fiduciary duty towards the shareholders. Thirdly, 
investors holding at least 10%, individually or as group, can request an interim shareholder 
meeting. If the Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors are unable or unwilling to preside the 
meeting, the shareholders can preside the meeting themselves. Fourthly, investors holding at least 
10%, individually or as a group, have the right to initiate a motion to dissolve the company if the 
firm is undergoing serious and unrepairable difficulties which will lead to significant shareholder 
value losses. Finally, firms are required to implement cumulative voting if the controlling 
shareholder holds more than 30%. Besides these active tactics, foreign investors always have the 
option to discuss matters through private negotiations. In the past, both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors have used several of the aforementioned strategies to impact the behavior of 
Chinese firms. Even knowing that foreign investors might use these strategies, can give enough 
leverage over Chinese firms. 
The willingness to actively monitor and promote good governance alone might not lead to 
actual improvements. In the case of China, 68% of the investors rate the difficulty of 
communicating with management and the Board of Directors of Chinese companies as “very 
difficult” (Allen and Rui 2018). A variety of reasons are given to support why foreign investors 
have difficulties in engaging with Chinese firms. Firstly, not only the substantial differences in 
language, but also cultural differences make it hard to communicate effectively. Secondly, getting 
access to key-level executives is often considered a challenge. Thirdly, there is a lack of corporate 
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governance knowledge by both Investor Relations (IR) personnel and management. Finally, and 
maybe most importantly, the high number of firms with significant controller shareholder 
ownership make it difficult to have an influence, especially considering that foreign investors often 
only own a limited portion of the shares. 
We therefore predict that foreign investors will in fact have a significant monitoring effect on 
corporate governance, but that substantial changes will only occur under certain conditions. We 
firstly propose that foreign investors need to own a large enough share to have an effective 
influence. The size of the ownership level will be an important factor in the success rate of both 
shareholder activism cases and private dialogues with the firm. We go more in depth in the 
methodology section on what we define as a large enough share. This view is supported by Phung 
and Vy (2013) who found that non-concentrated foreign ownership has no monitoring effect on 
Vietnamese publicly-listed firms. Secondly, it is imperative that foreign investors stay invested in 
the firms for more than one year. There are two reasons for this. One, in order to implement 
significant changes to the corporate governance structures, time is necessary. Two, Chinese firms 
will be more willing to engage in meaningful conversations if they know that their interests are 
aligned with those of the foreign investors. Supporting this idea, David Smith, the head of 
Corporate Governance at Aberdeen Standard Investments, a large QFII in China, states that the 
interest of Chinese companies in Aberdeen’s proposals increases, once they see a longer-term 
investment horizon of the QFII (Allen and Rui 2018).  
4. Data collection  
4.1.Foreign and institutional ownership 
We collected all end-of-the-year foreign ownership data manually from the FactSet database 
for the years 2005 - 2017. We define foreign ownership as the sum of the end-of-year holdings of 
all foreign investors divided by the firm’s total market capitalization. FactSet gathers the 
institutional ownership data from National Regulatory Authorities, the company websites, annual 
reports, daily transactional amounts, and mutual fund associations. Since we are interested in 
foreign institutional investors, we make two adjustments to the foreign ownership data. Firstly, we 
exclude all data for fiscal paradises, including British Virgin Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Barbados and Bermuda, as these are mostly used for fiscal purposes. Secondly, we exclude 
all data for foreign individuals. As mentioned earlier, there are different types of foreign 
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investments: strategic investments, QFII/RQFII and the Connect programs. Since strategic 
investments are characterized by larger ownership shares and by a more long-term horizon, we 
differentiate between strategic investments and institutional investors. We define strategic 
investments as all foreign investments by foreign private and public companies.  
We collected domestic institutional ownership from the China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. CSMAR gathers the institutional ownership data from both interim 
and annual reports of China’s listed enterprises. CSMAR distinguishes seven types of institutional 
investors: funds, securities brokerages, insurance companies, social security funds, trusts, finance 
companies and banks.  We define total Domestic Institutional Ownership as the sum of the 
holdings of the seven types of institutional investors divided by the firms total market 
capitalization. 
Figure 3 gives an overview of the foreign ownership data by country. Investors from 42 
countries have entered the Chinese capital markets in the last 12 years. We can see that the share 
of foreign investors has increased almost every year between 2005 and 2017, except for the years 
2014 and 2015. On average, the share of foreign ownership has increased from 0.35% to 1.32% in 
the last 12 years. The most prominent foreign country by far is Hong Kong, which claims on 
average 52.09% of the total foreign ownership share. Other noteworthy countries are Taiwan, 
United States, Japan and United Kingdom. The summary statistics in Table 5 show that domestic 
institutional ownership is significantly higher than foreign ownership, with an average value of 
5.39%. 
4.2.Firm-level corporate governance 
We use two different metrics in order to capture the level of corporate governance as best as 
possible: a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) consisting of 19 constituents and a Transparency 
Disclosure Rating (TDR) compiled by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We collected all elements 
for the CGI and the TDR from CSMAR. The CGI can be broadly divided into three different 
categories: board characteristics (seven attributes), ownership characteristics (six attributes), and 
conduct characteristics (six attributes).  The board characteristics include the chairman’s age, 
board size, board independence, board meetings, supervisory board size, CEO duality and 
qualifications of independent directors. The ownership characteristics include ownership 
concentration, state shares, insider ownership, separation between ownership and control, presence 
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of blockholders and non-negotiable shares. The conduct characteristics include numbers of 
commissions established, internal control disclosure, enforcement actions, foreign auditor and two 
measurements of related-party transactions. Table 3 gives an overview of the exact definition and 
the sources of the individual corporate governance attributes. Table 4 gives the correlation matrix 
between the different corporate governance attributes. Table 5 shows that the average CGI score 
is equal to 10.032 out of 19 (52.8%). 
The Transparency Disclosure Rating, compiled by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, takes into 
account the quality of listed firm’s public announcements, and the firm’s overall conduct in respect 
of protecting the rights of investors (MondoVisione 2019). The rating considers the conduct of the 
firm, the controlling shareholders, directors, supervisors, senior management, and information 
disclosure staff. A quantitative scoring method is used to score each criterion and  subsequently to 
rank each firm according to four grades: A, B, C, and D, where A and D are respectively the highest 
and the lowest score. In 2018, 17.96% of firms received a rating C and D, while 82.04% received 
a rating of A and B. For practical purposes, we modified the letter grades into numbers. A, B, C, 
and D become respectively 1, 2, 3, and 4. Table 5 gives the summary statistics for the corporate 
governance metrics. The average rating during our sample period is 2.970. 
4.3.Firm Characteristics 
We obtained firm-level characteristics and other control variables from the CSMAR database. 
We used the following control variables in our regressions: log of total assets in (Size), the 
percentage change in revenue from year T-1 to T (Growth), the ratio of total cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets (Cash), the ratio of total liabilities over total assets (Leverage), the 
ratio of operating profit to total assets (ROA), the ratio of the sum of total liabilities and end-of-
year market capitalization to total assets (MBratio), the ratio of the difference between total assets 
and total current assets to total assets (PPE), and whether a firm is cross-listed on any stock 
exchange outside China (Foreign Listing). Growth and ROA are winsorized at the lower 1% levels, 
while MBratio is winsorized at the upper 1% level. The remaining control variables are not 
winsorized as there are no significant outliers. Table 5 gives an overview of the summary statistics 
of all firm-specific control variables.  The summary statistics show that the median firm has 
respectively a ratio of cash and cash receivables and PPE to total assets of 14.7% and 42.4%. In 
addition, we find that the median firm has a significant amount of leverage (45% of total assets). 
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In terms of ROA and revenue growth, we find median values of respectively 4% and 12%. Finally, 
we find that the median market-to-book ratio is equal to 2.00 and that 10% of Chinese firms have 
at least one foreign listing. Table 6 gives the exact definitions of the control variables. Table 7 
gives the correlation table between the different control variables, corporate governance metrics, 
and foreign ownership. 
5. Methodology 
The biggest hurdle in analysing the relationship between corporate governance and foreign 
ownership is endogeneity concerns. A positive association between the current levels of foreign 
ownership and firm-level corporate governance might not imply causality or monitoring. It is 
possible that foreign investors avoid firms with corporate governance issues and only invest in 
those firms who already have sound corporate governance mechanisms in place. Leuz, et al. (2009) 
indeed found evidence that American institutional investors avoid foreign firms with low levels of 
corporate governance. An increase in corporate governance might therefore be attributable to the 
firm itself, and not due to the monitoring role of foreign or domestic institutional investors. To 
alleviate these concerns, we include several different methodologies.   
Previous researchers most often use two different methods to get around this issue: they either 
include lagged variables or look at the effect of changes in institutional ownership (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011; Min and Bowman, 2015; Boone and White, 2015). First, lagged variables allow us to 
examine the relation between the earlier foreign ownership and future levels of corporate 
governance. We can therefore more easily analyze causality by looking at values over time, instead 
of contemporary changes. Secondly, by looking at changes instead of level values, we can measure 
the effect of an increase in foreign ownership on corporate governance. With the purpose of 
reducing endogeneity concerns as much as possible, we combine both methods. In other words, 
we look at the effect of lagged, significant changes of foreign ownership on the current level of 
corporate governance. 
In order to determine a “significant” change, we need to take into account that the level of 
foreign ownership in China is still quite limited (See summary statistics Figure 3). We 
consequently use three different values to define a significant increase: 4, 7 and 10 percentage 
points. (i.e. the level of foreign ownership is equal to at least 4%, 7%, and 10% after the increase.) 
We choose these cut-off values for two reasons. On one hand, investors holding these levels of 
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ownership are able to have a significant effect on the election of board of directors and supervisory 
board members, which could subsequently protect their and other minority shareholder interests. 
One could argue that this is not the case when there is a significant controlling shareholder. 
However, cumulative voting is mandatory for firms where the controlling shareholder holds more 
than 30% (Xi and Chen 2014). On the other hand, the selling of the respective share levels would 
send out a strong signal to the market on possible issues at the firm. Investors therefore hold a 
significant amount of leverage over the firm. We do not include higher values than 10%, since the 
number of firms with changes of 10% in foreign ownership is limited. Next, we include two 
different lags. We include both the change from year T-2 to T-1 and the change from year T-1 to 
T.  
Another concern, which might lead to non-significant results, is the investment horizon of the 
foreign investor. On one hand, foreign investors, who are mostly interested in short-term profits, 
might not perform a monitoring role. On the other hand, Chinese firms might be less willing to 
engage with short-term investors (Allen and Rui 2018). In addition, time is needed in order to 
implement changes in the corporate governance framework of a firm. We therefore require that 
foreign ownership stay above a certain threshold (“lead level”) in the year after the change. To 
determine the value of a significant “lead level”, we need to consider that the Chinese market has 
a reputation of being volatile and turnover is quite high (Cheng and Li, 2015). We therefore define 
“require” that the “lead level” be at least 4%, or half of the original minimum change value. This 
means that the significant “lead levels” are 4%, 4%, and 5% (for respectively changes of 4, 7, and 
10 percentage points. In sum, the variable of interests are interaction dummy variables that take 
on the value of 1 if, firstly, there is a significant change of 4 , 7  or 10 percentage points, and, 
secondly, the level of foreign ownership at the end of the next year is  equal or larger than 
respectively  4%, 4% and 5%.  
Next, consistent with the literature, we include different control variables that might affect the 
level of corporate governance. First, we include domestic institutional ownership. In line with our 
foreign ownership variable, we create a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if there is a 
significant change in domestic institutional ownership. We determine the cut-off value as the 90th 
percentile of domestic institutional ownership changes, which is equal to a change of 4.80 
percentage points. Research on the monitoring role in China and other emerging markets has 
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shown mixed results. Stulz (2005) finds that domestic institutional investors do not have any 
significant impact on corporate governance in emerging markets. However, Wu, Johan and Rui 
(2012) and Aggarwal, Hu and Yang (2015) found that domestic institutional investors decrease 
the likelihood of fraud in Chinese publicly listed firms. 
Second, following Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), we include the size of the respective 
company (Size). Previous research has indicated that larger firms might have better corporate 
governance due to economies of scale. Third, we include the level of leverage of the respective 
firm (Leverage). Banks and other financial institutions might monitor firms with higher levels of 
debt more strictly. This increased level of monitoring might lead to improvements in corporate 
governance. However, Qian and Yeung (2015) state that Chinese financial institutions are not 
considered tough monitors. Thirdly, we include foreign listings (foreign listings), which is a 
dummy variable if the firm has issued B-shares or H-shares, or is listed on a foreign exchange. If 
Chinese firm issues B- or H-shares, it needs to follow international accounting standards (Liu 
2006). In addition, firms that are listed in other countries often adhere to stricter corporate 
governance regulations. Supporting this idea, Lin, Hutchinson and Percy (2015) found that audit 
committees of cross-listed Chinese firms are more effective in reducing management earnings. In 
addition, we include the growth in revenue (Growth), operating performance (ROA), market 
performance (Market-to-Book ratio), the level of liquid assets (Cash), and the ratio of fixed assets 
to total assets (PPE ratio). Since the purpose of our model is to explain future levels of corporate 
governance, all control variables are included as differences. Finally, in order to control for 
differences over time and industries, we include industry and time-fixed effects. A definition of all 
the control variables can be found in the data section and in table 6 (appendix).  
The equations of our main regressions can be represented as follows: 
𝐶𝐺𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1. 𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝐼𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝐼𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑗
. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 +  ∅𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝐶𝐺𝑡 is the dependent variable of interest and represents the current level of corporate 
governance. As mentioned above, this value is either the Corporate Governance Index, or the 
Transparency Disclosure Rating. 𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝐼𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡−1 and 𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝐼𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡−2 are the two 
dummy variables of interest. The former represents the change from T-1 to T, while the latter 
represents the change from T-2 to T-1. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 are the control variables that are mentioned in 
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the section above. ∅𝑡 and 𝜉𝑡 are respectively the industry-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. 𝜀𝑡 
represents the error-term. For clarity, we omit firm-level notations.  
In a second stage, we try to find more support for our hypothesis that corporate governance changes 
are driven by significant and long-term foreign ownership shares. Firstly, we include only changes 
of foreign ownership between 0.30 and 4.00 percentage points. We use 0.30 as threshold since it 
represents the 90th percentile of foreign ownership changes. We do not expect that changes under 
0.30 could have an effect on corporate governance. Secondly, we take out the “long-term” criteria. 
More specifically, we no longer require that the level of foreign ownership be equal to the threshold 
values of 4%, 4%, and 5% in the year after the change. As in the main regressions, we still include 
the same control variables and fixed effects. 
Thirdly, we perform two different robustness tests to address remaining concerns. First, we 
make sure that corporate governance changes are driven by institutional investors, and not by 
strategic investors. We therefore look at the effect of changes in strategic investments instead of 
changes in overall foreign ownership. Second, we take into account the criticism of Bhagat, Bolton 
and Romano (2008) on the use of corporate governance indices. Their criticism is based on the 
fact that they do not find any positive association between several well-known corporate 
governance indices, such as the G-Index (Gompers et al., 2003), E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell 2009), and Gov-score index (Brown and Caylor 2006), and corporate performance.  We 
therefore perform logit regressions on six individual corporate governance elements. Namely, we 
use the likelihood of fraud as dependent variable and five constituents of our corporate governance 
index: related party transactions (items 16 and 17), foreign auditor (item 7), board size (item 2), 
and board meeting (item 4).  
Finally, we provide evidence of both investor activism cases in which foreign investors played 
an important role, and private dialogues between Chinese firms and foreign investors. The 
objective is to ensure that foreign investors actively engage with Chinese firms in order to improve 
the corporate governance structures of the firm. An increase in the level of corporate governance 
might only be symbolic, i.e. to please or attract more foreign investors, if there is no active 
intervention strategy of the part of the foreign investor.  
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6. Results section 
6.1.Effect of significant and long-term foreign ownership change 
Table 7, 8, and 9 show the coefficients of the effect lagged significant changes of respectively 
4, 7, and 10 percentage points, on the current level of corporate governance. FOR_IO_Dummy T-
1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 are the two variables of interest, which take on the value if two 
conditions are met. Firstly, there needs to be a significant change in foreign ownership from year 
T-1 to T and year T-2 to T-1. More precisely, the change must be equal to at least 4, 7, and 10 
percentage points in respectively Tables 7, 8, and 9. Secondly, we require a significant threshold 
level of foreign ownership at the end of the year after the change. This threshold is equal to 4%, 
4%, and 5% in respectively Tables 7, 8, and 9. Refer to the hypothesis and data part on a more in-
depth rationale of the two variables of interest. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Tables 7, 8, and 9 use the Corporate Governance Index as the 
dependent variable. The results of table 7 show a positive and significant effect of a significant 
change in foreign ownership from year T-2 to T-1. A change of at least 4 percentage points in 
foreign ownership from year T-2 to T-1 leads to an increase in the Corporate Governance Index of 
0.53 by the end of year T. The coefficient for FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 is economically meaningful 
as well. A change of at least 4 percentage points in foreign ownership leads to an improvement of 
2.5% in Corporate Governance (0.53/19).  We divide by 19 since our Corporate Governance Index 
consists of 19 individual attributes. We find no significant effect of a change in foreign ownership 
from year T-1 to year T. This supports our hypothesis that it takes time before the monitoring role 
of foreign investors is turned into corporate governance improvements. The coefficients for 
domestic institutional ownership are not significant and even slightly negative (DOM_IO_Dummy 
T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-2). This suggests that foreign institutional investors are more 
rigorous monitors than domestic institutional investors. For the control variables, we find a positive 
and significant effect of foreign listings and the size variable. The former result is straightforward 
since Chinese firms that issue B- or H-shares are subject to more stringent legal rules. In addition, 
foreign exchanges often have more sound corporate governance criteria. The latter indicates that 
the larger firms are more prone to have better future corporate governance. This is consistent with 




Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Tables 8 and 9 support the results of table 7 and our hypothesis 
even more. The coefficient for a minimum of 7 and 10 percentage points are significant 
respectively at the 5% and 1% level. In economic terms, the effects become more significant. A 
change of respectively 7 and 10 percentage points from year T-2 to T-1 leads to an increase 5.0% 
(0.92/19) and 8.5% (1.56/19) in the firm-level corporate governance by the end year T. Since the 
coefficients for Tables 8 and 9 are higher than Table 7, it shows that the effect is driven by changes 
of at least 7 and 10 percentage points. The effect of FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 becomes stronger for 
7% and even significant for 10% changes. This implies that when the ownership level is high 
enough, it takes less time to implement corporate governance changes. It therefore supports our 
hypothesis that corporate governance improvements are driven by large foreign ownership shares. 
Next, the overall model seems to be capable of predicting the level of corporate governance, 
considering that the R2 value is equivalent to 0.40. Finally, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
show that there is no multicollinearity. 
Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Tables 7, 8, and 9 use the Transparency Disclosure Rating as the 
dependent variable. The results are consistent with the previous findings in columns (1), (2), and 
(3). Namely, lagged significant changes have a positive effect on future changes in the corporate 
governance. However, now we notice that the effect of T-1 changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-1) 
contribute more than T-2 changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-2). An explanation for this “faster” effect 
might be due to the difference between the two corporate governance metrics. The corporate 
governance index takes into account the broader corporate governance framework of a firm, while 
the Transparency Disclosure Rating focuses more on disclosure aspects of corporate governance. 
It goes without saying that it takes less time to improve the quality of public announcements and 
the general disclosure quality of the firm, than the overall corporate governance structures. 
Columns (6) of Tables 7, 8, and 9 show that, in economic terms, an increase between 4 and 10 
percentage points leads to an increase of approximately 12.5% (0.50/4) of the Transparency 
Disclosure Rating by the end of the following year. Finally, we still find no significant effect of 
domestic institutional investors on the transparency quality. For the remaining control variables, 
the foreign listings variable is still positive and significant, while the size is still significant but has 
turned negative.  
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Overall, our main results show that lagged significant changes in foreign ownership have a 
statistically and economically significant impact on corporate governance. Following our 
hypothesis, the results in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Tables 7, 8, and 9 indicate that the effect of 
T-2 changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-2) are more significant than T-1 changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-
1). On one hand, this shows that it takes time to implement corporate governance changes. On the 
other hand, it suggests as well that Chinese firms might be more willing to change corporate 
governance structures if foreign institutional investors have a long-term horizon and align their 
interests with those of the firm.  However, to improve the disclosure quality, less time is needed. 
This can be seen by the larger effect of FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 over FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 on the 
Transparency Disclosure Rating in columns (4), (5), and (6) of Tables 7, 8, and 9. We find no 
significant effect of domestic institutional investors for either the corporate governance index or 
the Transparency disclosure rating (DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-2). 
6.2.Effect of smaller changes and short-term foreign ownership  
In order to support our hypothesis that corporate governance changes are driven by significant 
and longer-term foreign investors, we show the results for both smaller changes and shorter-term 
investments. For the former case, we consider only foreign ownership changes between 0.30 and 
4 percentage points. We choose 0.30 as a threshold value for two reasons. Firstly, we do not expect 
that changes under 0.30 percentage points could have any significant effect on corporate 
governance. The foreign institutional investors would have neither enough voting power to elect 
members of the board of directors or supervisory board nor have enough leverage to threaten the 
management with the selling of their shares. Secondly, we take 0.30 since it is the 90th percentile 
of foreign ownership changes in our sample. We still require the “lead” condition. More precisely, 
we require that foreign ownership is at least 0.30% at the end of the year after the change. To 
measure the importance of the long-term horizon, we take out the “lead” condition for the foreign 
ownership dummy. FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 thus take on the value of 1 
if there is a change of 4, 7, or 10 percentage points. Overall, if we find a lesser effect of the 
FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 on corporate governance in Table 10 and 11 
compared to Tables 7, 8, and 9, it would imply that corporate governance changes are driven by 
larger and longer-term foreign investor shares. The results in Table 10 and 11 are indeed consistent 
with this hypothesis. 
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Table 10 shows the results of the lagged ownership changes, between 0.30 and 4.00 
percentage points, on the current level of corporate governance. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the 
corporate governance index as the dependent variable, while columns (4), (5), and (6) use the 
Transparency Disclosure rating. In both cases, we still find a significant effect. However, the effect 
is smaller, both in statistical and economical terms. A change in ownership between 0.30% and 
4.0% from year T-2 to T-1 leads to an increase in firm-level corporate governance of 
approximately 1.7% (0.3235/19). This is a decrease of 0.8, 3.3, and 6.8 percentage points 
compared to changes of at least 4, 7, and 10 percentage points. For the Transparency Disclosure 
rating, an increase between 0.30 to 4.0 percentage points from year T-1 to T leads to an increase 
of 7.0% (0.2812/4) by the end of the year. This is a decrease of around 5 percentage points on 
average compared to changes of at least 4, 7, and 10 percentage points. 
Table 11 shows the results without the long-term criteria. Again, we still find significant 
results, but there is a substantial reduction compared to the results of Tables 7, 8, and 9. Columns 
(1), (2), and (3) use the Corporate Governance Index as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows 
that the effect of 4 percentage point changes becomes insignificant once we take out the “lead” 
criteria. The coefficients for FOR_IO_DUMMY T-2 of columns (2) and (3) show a reduction of 
27.48% ((0.9286-0.6740)/0.6740) and 38.30% ((1.5633-0.9645)/0.9645) on the effect of corporate 
governance compared to the foreign ownership variable with the long-term criteria. Columns (4), 
(5), and (6) use the Transparency Disclosure Rating as a dependent variable. The magnitude of the 
coefficients of FOR_IO_DUMMY T-1 is decreased by 44.47% ((0.4879-0.2709)/0.2709), 33.40% 
((0.5751-0.3830)/0.3830), and 14.88% ((0.4999-0.4255)/0.4255) for respectively 4, 7, and 10 
percentage points compared to the foreign ownership variable with the long-term criteria. For both 
the Corporate Governance Index and Transparency Disclosure rating, we see that the decreasing 
effect of taking out the long-term criteria becomes less severe for higher ownership variables. 
These results therefore indicate that corporate governance changes are driven by larger foreign 
ownership shares. In addition, the reduction in the effect of the foreign ownership variable without 
the lead criteria, shows that the long-term criteria is an important aspect as well. 
6.3.Robustness testing 
In the first robustness tests, we make sure that foreign institutional investors are driving 
corporate governance changes, and not strategic investors. Since they hold larger shares of the 
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company, they might be more incentivised to monitor the firm more thoroughly. Table 12 shows 
the results of the effect of changes in strategic investments on future corporate governance. 
Strategic Investment ∆Dummy T-1 and Strategic Investment ∆Dummy T-2 are dummy variables 
that take on the value of 1 if there is a positive change in strategic investments from respectively 
year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show no positive or significant effect of 
strategic investors on corporate governance. In other tables that are not published, we include only 
larger changes in strategic investors and include the long-term investment criteria as well. We find 
similar results as in table 11 in both cases. These results support our hypothesis that foreign 
institutional investors are driving corporate governance changes, and not strategic investors. It 
therefore implies that foreign institutional investors have more experience in engaging with the 
management of firms, monitoring conduct, and ultimately improving corporate governance. 
Secondly, we take into account the criticism of some authors on corporate governance indices. 
(Bhagat et al., 2008) state that indices are not proper metrics to measure the level of corporate 
governance. (Refer to the methodology part for more information on their comments concerning 
corporate governance indices.) To address these issues, we perform logit regressions with six 
individual corporate governance attributes. We choose these corporate governance attributes based 
on their importance for corporate governance structures. (Refer to the methodology part and the 
appendix (Table 3) for a more in-depth explanation of the different governance attributes.) In 
contrast to the other regressions, we use lagged levels of foreign ownership instead of changes. 
We use lagged values since we do not want predict future changes in corporate governance. Rather, 
we want to see if the lagged presence of foreign investors has a positive effect on corporate 
governance mechanisms. In line with this, we include the lagged level of domestic institutional 
investors instead of changes as well. Table 13 shows the coefficients. According to our hypotheses, 
we find a positive effect on four out of six corporate governance measures. In line with our 
expectations, we find that the significant effect is derived from T-1 lagged changes and not T-2.  
The results show that lagged foreign ownership decreases the likelihood of related-party 
transactions (column 3), increases the likelihood of having a foreign auditor (column 4), and has a 
positive effect on board structures and conduct (column 5 and 6). We find no significant effects 
for the likelihood of fraud (column 1) and the second related-party transactions measure (column 
2). Again, we find no significant effect for domestic institutional investors (Domestic Ownership T-
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1 and Domestic Ownership T-2). In addition, we find that foreign listings have a positive and significant 
effect for all corporate governance attributes, except for board size (column 5). 
Finally, we discuss some noteworthy comments. First, there is some robustness testing that we 
do not consider in our research. Firstly, we do not include a 2SLS model due to a lack of proper 
instrumental variable. Aggarwal et al. (2011) use two different instrumental variables to account 
for foreign ownership: dividends and inclusion in the MSCI world index. First, dividends would 
not be a good measurement for foreign ownership in China. Indeed, regulation on issuing new 
shares dictates that firms need to pay-out dividends for three years straight (Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
Dividends might therefore not be a monitoring sign of institutional investors. Second, MSCI only 
recently started including Chinese A-shares in the emerging MSCI index. The sample period 
would therefore be too short to use this as an effective instrumental variable. However, future 
research should be able to include this as an instrumental variable. Second, we state that our 
hypotheses and results are not just evidence that foreign institutional investors use corporate 
governance as an investment criteria. If only this was the case, and there was no monitoring effect, 
we would just see a positive association between the current levels of foreign ownership and the 
current level of corporate governance. Even if the corporate governance structures of these firms 
might already be more sound than other firms, the fact that lagged and significant changes in 
foreign ownership lead to future corporate governance improvements strongly suggests that there 
indeed is a monitoring effect.  
6.4. Shareholder activism and engagement cases 
Finally, we analyze the frequency of shareholder activism and engagement cases to ensure 
that foreign institutional investors are able to actively influence Chinese firms from a practical 
point of view. Ding (2018) does an extensive research on shareholder activism in China and 
identifies 26 shareholder activism cases between 1994 and 2014 (Table 15). Institutional investors, 
both domestic and foreign, have used several strategies to actively influence Chinese companies 
such as shareholder proposals (13), proxy voting (10), private meetings (2), call for shareholder 
meeting (2), legal action (2), and press conferences (2)10. There are a variety of topics including 
voting against new share issuances, electing and/or removing new directors, proposing 
 
10 The sum of the types of activism is larger than 26 since multiple strategies were used in several activism cases. 
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amendments to the articles of association, and improving corporate governance structures. In 16 
out of the 26 cases, the institutional investors achieved their objective.  
In ten out of the 26 activism cases, a foreign investor, either as a minority shareholder in a 
Joint Venture or as a QFII, was the main driver or active participant behind a  shareholder activism 
case. In most instances, the activist shareholder was a sino-foreign joint venture in which the 
foreign investor held between 25% and 49% of the shares.  Compared to domestic institutional 
investors, foreign investors have been significantly more effective in reaching their goal. Out of 
the ten cases, eight were successful, one was partly successful, and one failed. The latter case was 
a joint effort between China Asset Management, in which Power Corporation of Canada and 
MacKenzie investments limited have a combined ownership of 28%11, China Southern Asset 
Management and Bosera Asset Management to amend the articles of association of Vanke in 2004. 
On the other hand, domestic institutional investors have a significantly lower success rate of 
37.5%.  
In terms of activist strategies, Table 15 shows an important pattern. In nine out of the ten 
cases, the foreign investor joined efforts with domestic institutional investors. There are two 
potential reasons for this trend. Firstly, foreign investors often do not own large enough shares to 
outvote controlling shareholders. They therefore need the support of domestic institutional 
investors to obtain enough leverage. Secondly, domestic institutional investors can offer important 
advice since they have more know-how in manoeuvring through the Chinese legal system. Only 
in the case of “Eastern Airline v Rongtong Asset Management”, in which the Japanese Nikko 
Asset Management holds a 40% stake12, was the activism process initiated without other domestic 
institutional investors. Out of all cases, “Gree Electric Appliances v Penghua Fund management 
and Yale Endowment Fund” stands out the most. Firstly, both investment funds have a significant 
foreign influence. Penghua Fund Management is a Sino-Foreign Joint Venture in which Eurizon 
Capital SGR S.p.A holds 49% of the shareholdings13. Yale Endowment Fund is a QFII member 
since 2006. Secondly, they succeeded in getting their candidate to the Board of Directors of Gree 
 
11 Ownership level of 28% is at the end of 2018. Both institutional investors have been shareholders since April 
1998 (EY 2018) 
12 Ownership level of 40% is at the end of 2018. Nikko Asset Management has been a shareholder of Rongtong 
Fund since May 2001 (EY 2018). 
13 Ownership level of 49% is at the end of 2018. Eurizon Capital SGR S.p.A. has been a shareholder of Penghua 
Fund since December 1998. (EY 2018) 
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Electric Appliances with a limited level of shareholder ownership. More precisely, they combined 
their respective shareholdings of 1.6% and 1.76% to reach the required 3% ownership level to 
launch an interim proposal meeting and bring forward their candidate. The two investment funds 
succeeded in convincing other minority shareholder and, with the help of the cumulative voting 
system, successfully elected their candidate. 
Especially in between 2015 and 2017, shareholder activism became more common in China. 
This increase was mostly attributable to a relaxation in the investment opportunities for insurance 
companies (Holthuis, Jiao and Liu 2019). A well-known insurance company case is “Vanke v 
Baoneng” (2016), in which Baoneng, a domestic insurance company, accused Vanke’s CEO of 
misconduct and being overpaid with his salary of 7.5 million USD. In order to actively pursue 
Vanke, Baoneng increased their ownership level to become the controlling shareholder. In 
addition, both Baoneng and China Resources Ltd., the second largest shareholder of Vanke, used 
WeChat and newspaper articles to publicly oppose Vanke’s management. Nonetheless, the 
increase in shareholder activism was short-lived, as the CSRC perceived them as troublemakers 
who were mostly interested in “rocking the boat and collecting the benefits”. The then chairman 
of the CSRC even dubbed them as “demonic and evil creatures” (Holthuis, Jiao and Liu 2019). In 
sum, we find significant evidence that shareholder activism has been a channel for both domestic 
and foreign institutional investors to guide the behavior of Chinese companies. 
In addition to shareholder activism, institutional investors have a more discrete option to 
communicate and influence Chinese enterprises. Namely, they can engage in private dialogues 
with the Board of Directors and key personnel to voice their concern or enquire more information 
about certain topics. Private dialogues might be more beneficial for institutional investors for 
several reasons. Firstly, legal enforcement of minority shareholder rights is still considered quite 
weak (Wang 2019). Secondly, there is currently no compensation mechanisms in place for the 
activist investor to reclaim costs incurred (Holthuis, Jiao and Liu 2019). Thirdly, in the case of 
State-Owned Enterprises, foreign institutional investors are wary to criticize  them publicly in fear 
of irritating the Chinese government (Kodaira 2019). Finally, engaging with Chinese firms in 
good-faith can lead to mutually beneficial compromises and can foster a trust relationship, which 
has an important place in Chinese society. Finding evidence of private dialogues is difficult since 
most action happens behind closed doors. However, Yoon (2017) tries to circumvent this issue by 
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analyzing so-called “Broker Facilitated Private Meeting” in which foreign institutional investors 
communicate with Chinese firms at corporate events organised by foreign brokers. His results 
show that Chinese firms have significantly increased the frequency of dialogues with foreign 
investors. More precisely, he finds that the amount of facilitated meetings with Shanghai-listed 
firms has quadrupled since the inception of the Shanghai-Hong Kong connect program in 2014. In 
addition, he finds that every meeting leads to an average increase of 30% in foreign ownership. 
Finally, both Investec Asset Management (2018) and Aberdeen Investments (2018), stated recently 
that Chinese firms have shown more interest to discuss corporate governance related and other 
topics.  
7. Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to determine if foreign institutional investors have had a 
positive impact on the corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese publicly listed firms. To test 
this, we manually collected an extensive foreign ownership database from FactSet, differentiating 
among the countries of origin. In order to measure corporate governance as well  as possible, we 
used different metrics. Firstly, we compiled a corporate governance index, taking into account 19 
different individual governance attributes. Secondly, we used a Transparency Disclosure Rating 
provided by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Finally, we used individual corporate governance 
attributes. Next, in order to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we used several methodologies. First, 
we looked at the effect of lagged, significant changes in foreign ownership on future levels of 
corporate governance. Second, we performed logistic regressions with the lagged level of foreign 
ownership as the independent variable of interest. In addition, we implemented a variety of 
robustness tests to further support our main results. 
Overall, our results show that the presence of foreign institutional investors has significantly 
improved the firm-level corporate governance of Chinese publicly listed firms. More precisely, we 
found that corporate governance changes are driven by long-term and large foreign investments. 
A long-term change in foreign ownership of at least 4, 7, and 10 percentage points in year T-2 
leads to an average increase of respectively  2.5%, 5.0% and 8.5%. For the Transparency 
Disclosure Rating, long-term changes of at least 4 percentage points in year T-1 led to an average 
increase of 12.5%. We showed as well that the effect becomes less significant when looking at 
smaller changes and taking out the long-term criteria. In additon, we found that lagged levels of 
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foreign ownership decrease the likelihood of related-party transactions, increase the likelihood of 
having a foreign auditor, and have a positive impact on the board structure and conduct. 
Our research has important implications for Chinese policy towards foreign institutional 
investors. The Chinese economy is entering a new stage of development, one where consumption 
and innovation will replace export and masnufacturing. Wang Yiming, deputy director of the 
development research center of the state council, states that China is transitioning from the world 
factory to the world market (XinhuaNet 2019). Ambitous plans such as  Made in China 2025 
further support this hypothesis. However, to support this transitional stage, efficient capital 
markets might be essential. On one hand, developed capital markets can provide new financing 
channels for enterprises. On the other hand, developed markets enable firms to share their 
profitsand risks with other investors and offer valuable investments opportunities to the Chinese 
population and investors. Our research indicates that the Chinese government and the CSRC can 
further promote sound development of the Chinese capital markets by relaxing the current 
restrictions for foreign investors. Especially in terms of owership limits, namely that the sum of 


























CSRC introduces new 
regulation concerning 
independent directors
CSRC implements the 
"Code of Corporate 
Governance"
CSRC starts the non-
tradable share reform
Significant amendement to 
Company and securities 
law
SZSE releases CSR 
reporting guidelines
Convergence of domestic 
accounting and auditing 
standards with IFRS and 
ISA.
SSE releases CSRC 
reporting guidelines
2001 2002 2005 2005/2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2015
Timeline of most signficant changes in CG regulatory framework
Figure 1: Most significant regulatory developments 
The figure below gives an overview of the most important regulatory changes implemented by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), and other 
regulatory bodies. Source: CSRC website and (Allen and Rui 2018). 
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Table 1: Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) Criteria 
This table shows the criteria used in applying for the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
program before and after 2012. A distinction is made among four different types of investors. Source:  
http://english.sse.com.cn/laws/qfii/  
Financial institution 2006-2012 >2012 
Asset Management Institution ▪ 5 years experience 
▪ 5 Billion USD AUM 
▪ 2 years of experience 
▪ 500 Million USD AUM 
Securities Company ▪ 30 years experience 
▪ 1 Billion USD paid-in capital 
▪ 10 Billion USD AUM 
▪ 5 years experience 
▪ 500 Million USD Net 
Assets 
▪ 5 Billion USD AUM 
Insurance Company ▪ 15 years experience 
▪ 5 Billion USD AUM 
▪ 2 years experience 
▪ 500 Million USD AUM 
Commercial Bank ▪ 10 Billion USD AUM 
▪ Top 100 worldwide in total 
assets 
▪ 10 years experience 
▪ 300 Million USD tier 1 
capital 
▪ 5 Billion USD AUM 
Other Institutional Investors ▪ 5 years experience 
▪ 5 Billion USD AUM 
▪ 2 years experience 





Figure 2: QFII and RQFII Quotas 
This graph shows the quotas allocated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) to the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) and Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (RQFII) since the inception of both programs. Source: CSRC website 
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Table 2: Countries that signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the CSRC. 
This table shows all the countries whose securities regulatory institutions signed a MoU with the CSRC. 
This is an important criterion for a foreign institutional investor which wants to apply for the Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) license. Source: CSRC website. 
 
Country Year Country Year 
Hong Kong 1993 United States 1994 
Singapore 1995 Australia 1996 
United Kingdom 1996 Japan 1997 
Malaysia 1997 Brazil 1997 
Ukraine 1997 France 1998 
Luxemburg 1998 Germany 1998 
Italy 1999 Egypt 2000 
South Korea 2001 Romania 2002 
South Africa 2002 Netherlands 2002 
Belgium 2002 Canada 2003 
Switzerland 2003 Indonesia 2004 
Portugal 2004 Nigeria 2005 
Vietnam 2005 India 2005 
Argentina 2006 Jordan 2006 
Norway 2006 Turkey 2006 
United Arab Emirates 2006 Thailand 2007 
Liechtenstein 2008 Mongolia 2008 
Russia 2008 Dubai 2008 
Ireland 2008 Austria 2008 
Spain 2009 Taipei 2009 
Malta 2010 Kuwait 2010 
Pakistan 2010 Israel 2011 
Qatar 2011 Lao PDR 2011 
Sweden  2012 Belarus 2014 
Brunei 2014 Jersey 2014 
Kazakhstan  2018 Iran 2018 
Cayman Islands 2018 Poland 2015 
Chile 2017 Greece 2017 
Abu Dhabi 2016 Isle of Man 2014 
 
Table 3: Corporate Governance Index  
This table gives the summary statistics (N, Mean, Median, Standard Deviation, Q1, and Q3) for the individual 
corporate governance attributes, the Corporate Governance Index, the Transparency Disclosure Rating, 
foreign ownership, and the remaining control variables. Growth and ROA are winsorized at the lower 1% 
level. MBratio is winsorized at the upper 1% level. 
 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Chairman’s Age 27,844 51.818 52.000 7.166 47.000 56.000 
Board Size 29,028 8.903 9.000 1.929 8.000 9.000 
Board Independence 29,026 0.369 0.333 0.054 0.333 0.400 
Board Meeting 29,166 9.456 9.000 4.022 7.000 11.000 
Supervisory Board Size 29,186 3.757 3.000 1.295 3.000 5.000 
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Ownership Concentration 29,183 35.650 33.470 15.549 23.470 46.390 
Auditor 28,774 0.080 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.000 
State Shares 29,174 0.097 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.068 
CEO Duality 28,236 0.238 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.000 
Ownership and Control Separation 27,846 5.100 0.000 7.910 0.000 9.022 
Insider Ownership 27,985 0.111 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.138 
Presence of Blockholders 29,109 22.762 21.330 13.887 11.260 32.470 
Commissions 28,287 3.863 4.000 0.728 4.00 4.00 
Internal Control 26,042 0.560 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Enforcement Actions 29,115 0.824 1.000 0.511 1.000 1.000 
Related Party Transactions (1) 27,910 0.036 0.008 1.415 0.004 0.022 
Related Party Transactions (2) 27,936 0.368 0.055 16.477 0.000 0.216 
Independent Director Qualification 29,111 0.555 0.333 0.699 0.000 1.000 
Non-Negotiable Shares 29,102 0.324 0.306 0.283 0.003 0.571 
Corporate Governance Index 22,969 10.032 10.000 2.149 9.000 12.000 
Foreign Ownership 28,156 1.078 0.000 5.741 0.000 1.130 
Strategic Investments 28,158 0.442 0.000 4.153 0.000 0.000 
Institutional Ownership 13,141 5.388 3.670 5.973 1.389 7.558 
Size 29,183 19.978 19,790 1.516 18,989 20,722 
Leverage 29,183 0.550 0.454 0.546 0.281 0.623 
Cash 29,150 0.191 0.147 0.152 0.086 0.250 
Market-to-Book ratio 28,630 2.821 2.047 2.591 1.402 3.257 
Growth 25,327 0.097 0.119 0.327 -0.015 0.244 
ROA 29,187 0.039 0.039 0.075 0.011 0.073 
PPE 28,894 0.440 0.424 0.222 0.269 0.596 
Foreign Listing 29,187 0.100 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 





Table 4: Corporate Governance Index constituents, definitions, measurements, and supporting literature.  
 
𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱𝒊,𝒕=∑ 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐦𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐦𝐬𝐣
𝟏𝟗
𝒋=𝟏  
Governance Mechanism Definition Measurement and supporting literature* 
1. Chairman’s Age Age of the company’s 
chairman 
Equals 1 if the age of the chairman of firm i in fiscal 
year t is less than the mean value of the sample in fiscal 
year t, and 0 otherwise. (Schweizer, Walker and Zhang 
2017); (Waelchli and Zeller 2013) 
 
2. Board Size Number of directors on the 
board of directors 
Equals 1 if the size of the board of firm i in year t is 
greater than the median value in year t, and 0 
otherwise. (Schweizer, Walker and Zhang 2017); 
(Chen, Firth, et al. 2006); (Qian and Yeung 2015) 
 
3. Board Independence Ratio of number of 
independent directors to 
Equals 1 if the board independence of firm i is higher 
than 0.33, and 0 otherwise. (Gao and Kling 2012); 








Foreign ownership by Year
Australia Canada Cyprus Gibraltar Hong Kong India
Ireland Israel Malaysia New Zealand Samoa Singapore
South-Africa Thailand United Kingdom United States Austria Belgium
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Figure 3: Foreign ownership summary 
The bar chart below gives a summary of the average level of foreign ownership per year and per country. Foreign 
ownership includes the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional 






total directors on the board 
of directors 
 
(Jiang, Wan and Zhao 2016); (Rezaee, et al. 2018); 
(Chen and Zhang 2014)  
 
4. Board Meeting Number of annual meetings 
of the board of directors 
Equals 1 if the number of annual board meetings for 
firm i in year t is less than the mean value of year t, 
and 0 otherwise. (Chen, Firth, et al. 2006); (Schweizer, 
Walker and Zhang 2017); (Xing, Tinghua and Hou 
2019) 
 
5. Supervisory Board Size Number of members on the 
Supervisory Board 
Equals 1 if the supervisory board size for firm i in year 
t is greater than the median value of year t, and 0 
otherwise. (Ding, Jia, et al. 2009); (Y. G. Shan, Value 
relevance, earnings management and corporate 
governance in China 2015); (Firth, Fung and Rui 
2007) 
 
6. Ownership Concentration Percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholder 
Equals 1 if the ownership of the largest shareholder of 
firm i in year t is in between Q1 and Q3, and otherwise 
0. (Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang 2015); (Beatson and 
Chen 2018); (Lo, Wong and Firth 2010); (Cheung, et 
al. 2008) 
 
7. Auditor  Hiring a Big 4 or other 
foreign auditor 
Equals 1 if the auditor is foreign or a member if the 
domestic big 4, and otherwise 0. (Schweizer, Walker 
and Zhang 2017); (Y. G. Shan, Value relevance, 
earnings management and corporate governance in 
China 2015); (Shan and McIver 2011) 
 
8. State Shares Percentage of shares held 
by the Chinese government 
Equals 1 if the state holds more than 5% of the shares 
of firm i in year t, and otherwise 0. (Qian and Yeung 
2015); (Chen and Zhang 2014); (Cheung, et al. 2008); 
(Liu, et al. 2015) 
 
9. CEO Duality If the positions of CEO and 
Chairman of the board of 
directors are occupied by 
the same person 
Equals 1 if the Chairman of the board position and 
CEO position are not occupied by the same person for 
firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. (Beatson and Chen 
2018); (Gao and Kling 2012); (Lo, Wong and Firth 
2010); (Rezaee, et al. 2018); (Haß, Johan and 
Schweizer 2016) 
 
10. Separation between ownership 
and Control rights 
 
Difference between the 
actual controller’s control 
and ownership of the 
company 
Equals 1 if there is no divergence between ownership 
and control for firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. (Qian 
and Yeung 2015); (Rezaee, et al. 2018); (Beatson and 
Chen 2018) 
 
11. Insider ownership Number of shares held by 
the members of the 
Management, Board of 
Directors and Supervisory 
Board 
Equals 1 if the insider ownership for firm i in year t is 
greater than 1%, and 0 otherwise. (Sami, Wang and 





12. Presence of Blockholders Number of shares held by 
the 2nd to 10th largest 
shareholders 
Equals 1 if the ownership of blockholders, for firm i in 
year t is higher than the mean, and 0 otherwise. (Chen 
and Zhang 2014); (Beatson and Chen 2018); (Jiang, 
Wan and Zhao 2016) 
 
13. Commissions Number of commissions 
established  
Equals 1 if 4 or more commissions have been 
established by firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
(Rezaee, et al. 2018); (Cheung, et al. 2008); (Gao and 
Kling 2012); (Lo, Wong and Firth 2010) 
 
14. Internal Control Disclosure of Internal 
Control Audit report 
Equals 1 if the audit report of internal control was 
disclosed by firm i in year t, and o otherwise. (Rezaee, 
et al. 2018) 
 
15. Enforcement Actions Enforcement actions 
carried out by the CSRC, 
Stock exchanges or other 
institutions 
Equals 1 if there were no enforcement actions in year 
i, 0 if there was an enforcement action in year i 
handled by the Stock exchanges and -1 if there was an 
enforcement action in year i handled by the CSRC. 
(Beatson and Chen 2018); (Cheung, et al. 2008); 
(Rezaee, et al. 2018) 
 
16. Related Party Transactions (1) Ratio of Other receivables 
over total Assets 
Equal 1 if the ORECTA (Net other receivables over 
total assets) of firm i in year t is smaller than the mean, 
and 0 otherwise. (Qian and Yeung 2015); (Zou, et al. 
2008);  
 
17. Related Party Transactions (2) Ratio of guarantees issued 
to related parties over Total 
Assets  
Equal 1 if Guarantees over total assets for firm i in year 
t is smaller than the median, and 0 otherwise. (Jiang, 
Wan and Zhao 2016) 
 
18. Qualification of independent 
directors 
Ratio of concurrent 
positions of independent 
directors to the total 
number of independent 
directors 
 
Equals 1 if the ratio of concurrent positions to number 
of independent directors for firm i in year t is greater 
than the median value for year t, and 0 otherwise. 
(Rezaee, et al. 2018); (Jiang, Wan and Zhao 2016) 
 
19. Non-Negotiable shares Percentage of Shares that 
are non-tradable. 
Equals 1 if the share of non-negotiable ownership for 
firm i in year t is smaller than the mean, and 0 









Table 5: Corporate Governance Attributes Correlation Matrix  
The following table gives the correlation among  the 19 different corporate governance attributes of our Corporate Governance Index (CGI). The following variables are 
included in the table: Age (Chairman’s Age), Bsize (Board Size), BIndep (Board Independence), BMeet (Board Meeting), SSize (Supervisory Board Size), Own 
(Ownership Concentration), Audit (Auditor), State (State Shares), CEOD (CEO Duality), Sep (Separation Between Ownership and Control Rights), Ins (Insider 
Ownership), Block (Presence of Blockholders), Comm (Commissions), Intern (Internal Control), Enforc (Enforcement Actions), RTP (1) (Related Party Transactions 1), 
RTP (2) (Related Party Transactions 2), INDQ (Qualification of Independent Directors) and NNEG (Non-Negotiable Shares). Refer to Table 3 and the data part for more 
information on the different attributes and how they are calculated.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15 (16) (17) (18) (20) 
(1) Age 
1.000                   
(2) BSize  
-0.059 1.000                  
(3) BIndep 
0.026 0.252 1.000                 
(4) BMeet  
-0.058 0.003 -0.017 1.000                
(5) SSize  
-0.052 0.299 -0.040 0.006 1.000               
(6) Own 
0.010 -0.039 -0.031 0.005 -0.019 1.000              
(7) Audit 
-0.069 0.193 0.041 -0.033 0.148 -0.035 1.000             
(8) State 
0.040 -0.193 0.055 0.020 -0.251 0.014 -0.071 1.000            
(9) CEOD 
-0.128 0.141 -0.064 -0.011 0.181 -0.025 0.077 -0.163 1.000           
(10) Sep 
0.015 0.022 0.055 -0.005 0.009 -0.039 -0.014 -0.080 -0.031 1.000          
(11) Ins 
-0.001 -0.070 -0.020 -0.014 -0.102 0.032 -0.064 0.090 -0.120 0.099 1.000         
(12) Block  
0.033 0.011 0.016 -0.005 -0.102 0.123 0.058 0.061 -0.114 0.049 0.113 1.000        
(13) Comm 
0.005 -0.044 0.023 -0.007 -0.048 0.021 -0.090 0.146 -0.043 0.026 0.007 0.047 1.000       
(14) Intern 
-0.014 -0.020 0.057 -0.015 -0.014 -0.004 0.037 0.229 -0.027 0.035 -0.069 0.032 0.159 1.000      
(15) Enforc 
-0.032 0.029 -0.014 0.068 0.030 0.007 0.042 -0.073 0.019 -0.004 0.010 0.007 -0.057 -0.075 1.000     
(16) RTP (1)  
-0.042 -0.002 -0.004 0.080 -0.019 0.015 0.026 0.078 -0.049 0.034 0.035 0.065 0.095 0.133 0.045 1.000    
(17) RTP (2)  
-0.028 0.036 0.000 0.126 0.022 -0.038 0.099 -0.076 -0.014 0.084 0.012 0.068 -0.062 -0.021 0.053 0.053 1.000   
(18) INDQ 
0.002 -0.049 0.013 -0.014 -0.061 -0.015 0.047 0.123 -0.050 0.040 0.023 0.065 0.082 0.141 -0.007 0.071 -0.002 1.000  
(19) NNEG  
-0.049 0.031 0.037 0.003 0.096 -0.053 0.042 0.311 0.105 -0.069 -0.137 -0.256 0.108 0.252 -0.067 0.005 -0.078 0.039 1.000 
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Table 6: Definition and source of Control variables, Independent Variables and Dependent Variables 
The following table gives an overview of the different variables used in the regressions, and how they are calculated. Refer to 
the data and methodology part for a more in-depth explanation of the respective variables. 
Control Variables Definition CSMAR ID / Other 
source 
CG Index Corporate Governance Index (See Table 4) Table 4 
CG Rating Transparency Disclosure Rating Company Opacity 
(Transparency of 
Listed Company) 
FOR_IO_DUMMY T-1 Dummy variable for foreign ownership change from year T-1 to T 
(refer to the data and methodology part for more information on this 
variable) 
FactSet 
FOR_IO_DUMMY T-2 Dummy variable for foreign ownership change from year T-2 to T-1 
(refer to the data and methodology part for more information on this 
variable) 
FactSet 
DOM_IO_DUMMY T-1 Dummy variable fore domestic institutional ownership. Takes on 
the value of 1 if the change from year T-1 to T is higher than the 
90th percentile of domestic institutional ownership changes (4.80%) 





DOM_IO_DUMMY T-2 Dummy variable fore domestic institutional ownership. Takes on 
the value of 1 if the change from year T-2 to T-1 is higher than the 
90th percentile of domestic institutional ownership changes (4.80%) 







Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a positive change in strategic 
investments from year T-1 to T. FactSet 
Strategic Investment 
∆Dummy T-2 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a positive change in strategic 
investments from year T-1 to T. FactSet 
Foreign Ownership T-1 T-1 lagged level of foreign ownership 
FactSet 
Foreign Ownership T-2 T-2 lagged level of foreign ownership 
FactSet 










Size 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) A004000000 (Total 
assets) 












and cash equivalents) ; 
A004000000 (Total 
assets) 











(Operating profit);  
A004000000 (Total 
assets) 






; A004000000 (Total 
assets) 





(Total Current Assets) 










Table 7: Correlation matrix of corporate governance metrics, foreign ownership and control variables  
The following table gives the correlation matrix between the two corporate governance metrics, foreign ownership, and the control variables. The 
following variables are included: CG Index (Corporate Governance Index), TRD (Transparency Disclosure Rating), For Own (Foreign Ownership 
– including QFII/RQFII, Strategic Investors, and Connect program), Strategic (Foreign Strategic Ownership), Inst (Domestic Institutional 
Ownership), Size, Lev (Leverage), Cash, MBRatio, Growth, ROA, Listing (Foreign Listing), PPE. Refer to Table 3 and the data part for more 
information on the different attributes and how they are calculated. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CG Index 1.000             
(2) For Own 0.044 1.000            
(3) Strategic  0.025 0.730 1.000           
(4) Inst 0.015 -0.005 -0.020 1.000          
(5) Size 0.164 0.124 0.033 0.073 1.000         
(6) Lev -0.051 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.063 1.000        
(7) Cash 0.104 -0.020 -0.012 0.030 -0.198 -0.017 1.000       
(8) MBRatio 0.052 -0.028 -0.010 0.041 -0.441 0.110 0.193 1.000      
(9) Growth 0.054 0.047 0.030 0.097 0.227 -0.022 -0.152 -0.074 1.000     
(10) ROA 0.125 0.051 0.023 0.092 0.085 -0.076 0.250 0.044 0.050 1.000    
(11) Listing 0.079 0.062 0.019 -0.049 0.252 0.014 -0.070 -0.071 0.024 -0.025 1.000   
(12) PPE 0.001 0.044 0.009 -0.014 0.185 -0.006 -0.487 -0.129 0.103 -0.149 0.115 1.000  
(13) TRD 0.210 0.058 0.022 0.086 0.246 -0.027 0.122 -0.064 0.114 0.346 0.004 -0.062 1.000 
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Table 8: Effect of lagged and significant changes in foreign ownership on the current level of corporate 
governance (4 percentage points) 
This tables shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of lagged foreign ownership changes (FOR_IO_Dummy 
T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2) on the present level of Corporate Governance. The first three columns use the 
Corporate Governance Index as dependent variables. The last three columns use the Transparency Disclosure Rating 
as dependent variable. Refer to the data part and the appendix for more detailed explanations on the two corporate 
governance metrics.  FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value 
of 1 if two conditions are met. Firstly, there needs to be a change of 4 percentage points from respectively year T-1 
to T or T-2 to T-1. Secondly, we require a threshold value of 4% at the end of the year after the change. Refer to the 
data part for a more in-depth explanation of the foreign ownership dummy variables. DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and 
DOM_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if there is a change of at least 4.80 percentage 
points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Refer to the appendix for the definition of the remaining control 
variables. All control variables are lagged, and both Industry and Time-fixed effects are added to the regressions. *, 
**, *** indicate significance of respectively 10%, 5%, and 1%. The average and max Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) are given at the bottom of the table. 
























































































































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,831 6,807 6,777 4,443 4,428 4,407 
R-Squared 0.407 0.408 0.409 0.393 0.393 0.396 
Min VIF 1.397 1.427 1.398 1.478 1.478 1.483 





Table 9: Effect of lagged and significant changes in foreign ownership on the current level of corporate 
governance (7 percentage points) 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of lagged foreign ownership changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 
and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2) on the present level of Corporate Governance. The first three columns use the Corporate 
Governance Index as dependent variables. The last three columns use the Transparency Disclosure Rating as dependent 
variable. Refer to the data part and the appendix for more detailed explanations on the two corporate governance metrics.  
FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if two conditions are 
met. First, there needs to be a change of 7 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Then, we 
require a threshold value of 4% at the end of the year after the change. Refer to the data part for a more in-depth 
explanation of the foreign ownership dummy variables. DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy 
variables that take on the value of 1 if there is a change of at least 4.80 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to 
T or T-2 to T-1. Refer to the appendix for the definition of the remaining control variables. All control variables are 
lagged, and both Industry and Time-fixed effects are added to the regressions. *, **, *** indicate significance of 
respectively 10%, 5%, and 1%.  The min and max Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are given at the bottom of the table. 
























































































































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
observations 6,850 6,825 6,814 4,453 4,438 4,428 
R-Squared 0.408 0.409 0.410 0.392 0.392 0.393 
Min VIF 1.396 1.396 1.397 1.477 1.478 1.482 





Table 10: Effect of lagged and significant changes in foreign ownership on the current level of corporate governance 
(10 percentage points) 
This tables shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of lagged foreign ownership changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and 
FOR_IO_Dummy T-2) on the present level of Corporate Governance. The first three columns use the Corporate Governance 
Index as dependent variables. The last three columns use the Transparency Disclosure Rating as dependent variable. Refer 
to the data part and the appendix for more detailed explanations on the two corporate governance metrics.  FOR_IO_Dummy 
T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if two conditions are met. Firstly, there needs 
to be a change of 10 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Secondly, we require a threshold value 
of 5% at the end of the year after the change. Refer to the data part for a more in-depth explanation of the foreign ownership 
dummy variables. DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if 
there is a change of at least 4.80 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Refer to the appendix for 
the definition of the remaining control variables. All control variables are lagged, and both Industry and Time-fixed effects 
are added to the regressions. *, **, *** indicate significance of respectively 10%, 5%, and 1%.  The minimum and maximum 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are given at the bottom of the table. 
























































































































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
observations 6,855 6,829 6,823 4,459 4,443 4,439 
R-Squared 0.408 0.409 0.409 0.391 0.391 0.392 
Min VIF 1.396 1.396 1.397 1.473 1.4749 1.474 






Table 11: Effect of lagged and significant changes in foreign ownership on the current level of corporate 
governance (0.30 to 4 percentage points) 
This tables shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of lagged foreign ownership changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 
and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2) on the present level of Corporate Governance. The first three columns use the Corporate 
Governance Index as dependent variables. The last three columns use the Transparency Disclosure Rating as dependent 
variable. Refer to the data part and the appendix for more detailed explanations on the two corporate governance metrics.  
FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if two conditions are 
met. Firstly, there needs to be a change between 0.30 and 4 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to 
T-1. Secondly, we require a threshold value of 0.30% at the end of the year after the change. Refer to the data part for a 
more in-depth explanation of the foreign ownership dummy variables. DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-
2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if there is a change of at least 4.80 percentage points from respectively 
year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Refer to the appendix for the definition of the remaining control variables. All control 
variables are lagged, and both Industry and Time-fixed effects are added to the regressions. *, **, *** indicate 
significance of respectively 10%, 5%, and 1%.  The minimum and maximum Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are given 
at the bottom of the table. 
























































































































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
observations 6,538 6,570 6,249 4,249 4,262 4,049 
R-Squared 0.414 0.4183 0.426 0.410 0.414 0.431 
Min VIF 1.410 1.406 1.421 1.505 1.543 1.509 





Table 12: Effect of lagged and significant changes in foreign ownership on the current level of corporate 
governance (4, 7, and 10 percentage points) without the long-term criteria. 
This tables shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of lagged foreign ownership changes (FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 
and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2) on the present level of Corporate Governance. The first three columns use the Corporate 
Governance Index as dependent variables. The last three columns use the Transparency Disclosure Rating as dependent 
variable. Refer to the data part and the appendix for more detailed explanations on the two corporate governance metrics.  
FOR_IO_Dummy T-1 and FOR_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if two conditions are 
met. Firstly, there needs to be a change of at least 4 (Columns 1 and 4), 7 (Columns 2 and 5), and 10 (Columns 3 and 6) 
percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1.. Refer to the data part for a more in-depth explanation 
of the foreign ownership dummy variables. DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables 
that take on the value of 1 if there is a change of at least 4.80 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 
to T-1. Refer to the appendix for the definitions of the remaining control variables. All control variables are lagged, and 
both Industry and Time-fixed effects are added to the regressions. *, **, *** indicate significance of respectively 10%, 
5%, and 1%.  The minimum and maximum Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are given at the bottom of the table. 






























































































































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
observations 6,843 6,843 6,843 4,453 4,453 4,453 
R-Squared 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.392 0.392 0.392 
Min VIF 1.396 1.397 1.397 1.476 1.476 1.474 
Max VIF 2.571 2.567 2.568 2.941 2.942 2.492 





Table 13: Effect of lagged strategic investments changes on current level corporate governance 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of lagged strategic investment changes (Strategic Investment 
∆Dummy T-1and Strategic Investment ∆Dummy T-1) on the present level of Corporate Governance. We only include 
the results with the Corporate Governance Index variable. We find similar results if we use the Transparency Disclosure 
Rating as dependent variable. Refer to the data part and the appendix for more detailed explanations on the Corporate 
Governance Index.   Strategic Investment ∆Dummy T-1 and Strategic Investment ∆Dummy T-2 are dummy variables 
that take on the value of 1 if there is a positive change in strategic investments from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 
to T-1. DOM_IO_Dummy T-1 and DOM_IO_Dummy T-2 are dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if there is 
a change of at least 4.80 percentage points from respectively year T-1 to T or T-2 to T-1. Refer to the appendix for the 
definition of the remaining control variables. All control variables are lagged, and both Industry and Time-fixed effects 
are added to the regressions. *, **, *** indicate significance of respectively 10%, 5%, and 1%. The min and max 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are given at the bottom. 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) 
CG Index CG Index CG Index 




































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES 
observations 6,860 6,850 6,848 
R-Squared 0.407 0.408 0.409 
MIN VIF 1.396 1.396 1.396 







Table 14: Logistics regression of the lag level of foreign ownership on six individual corporate governance attributes. 
This table shows the estimated coefficients of the effect of changes in foreign ownership on current levels of Corporate 
Governance. In this case, we measure Corporate Governance by utilizing six different individual attributes. The individual 
attributes are defined as follows. Fraud is equal to 1 if there was no case of corporate fraud for firm i in year t. RTP is equal to 
1 if net other receivables over total assets is lower than the median in year t. RTP2 is equal to 1 if guarantees over total assets is 
lower than the median in year t. Foreign auditor is equal to 1 if the firm had a foreign auditor or domestic branch of foreign 
auditor in China. Board size is equal to 1 if the board size of firm i is higher than the median in year t. Board Meeting is equal 
to 1 if the total number of board meetings of firm I, is less than the mean value of year t. (See Corporate Governance Index for 
more detailed definition). The independent variables of interest are Foreign Ownership T-1 and Foreign Ownership T-2, which 
are respectively equal to the T-1 lagged and T-2 lagged values of foreign ownership.  Refer to the appendix for the definition of 
the remaining control variables. All control variables are lagged, and both Industry and Time-fixed effects are added to the 
regressions. *, **, *** indicate significance of respectively 10%, 5%, and 1%. 













































































































































































Industry Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
observations 8,737 8,705 8,537 8,737 8,708 8,732 
Likelihood Ratio 79.53 393.94 825.56 2065.24 712.28 193.24 
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Table 15: Overview of investor activism cases between 1994-2014 
The following table gives an overview of all investor activism cases, the companies and investors 
involved, the type of activism, and the outcome from the year 1994 and until 2014. The cases annotated 
with a * are the ones with at least one foreign investors involved. F = failure, N = Unknown, S = 
Success. 
Year Case Topic Type of activism Outcome 
1994 China Vanke v Guotai Junan 
Securities 





2000 Hubei Xingfu v Mingliu 
Investment Company 
Regrouping of board of 
directors 
 
Call for shareholder 
meeting and proposal S 
2002 ZTE v Da Cheng Fund 
Management 
Voting against the 
issuance of H-shares 
 
Proxy voting (Joint 
effort) S 
2003 China Merchant Bank v 
China Asset Management*, 
NSSF and Shiji Securities 
 
Voting against the 
issuance of securities 
 
Private meeting and 
Proxy voting (Joint 
effort) 
S 
2004 China Vanke v China Asset 
Management*, China 
Southern Asset Management 
and Bosera Asset 
Management 
 
Amending articles Call for shareholder 
meeting and proposal 
F 
2004 Chongqing Baihuo v Huabao 
Xingye Asset Management* 
 
Voting against the 
issuance of new shares 
Proxy voting (Joint 
effort) S 
2007 Yinchuan Guangxia v Da 






2008 Pingan China v Da Cheng 




proposal to refinance 
Proxy voting 
F 
2008 Eastern Airline v Rongtong 
Asset Management* 
Voting against a 





2008 Saima v Shanghai Baoyin 
Investment and Consulting 
Company 
Proposals to improve 
corporate governance 
and elect new directors 
 
Private meeting and 
shareholder proposal 
F 
2010 Shuanghui v Harvest Asset 
















2011 Shanghai Wenhui Xinmin v 
Aegon Industrial Fund 




enactment of certain 
promises 
Press conference (Joint 
effort) 
S 
2011 Dashang v Shenzhen Heying 
Asset Management and 
Penghua Asset Management* 
 





2012 Chongqing Beer v Da Cheng 
Investment Fund 
 




2012 Gree Electric Appliance v 
Penghua Asset Management* 
and Yale Endowment Fund* 
Voting against 
appointment of director 
and proposing own 
candidate 
 
Proxy voting and 
shareholder proposal 
(Joint effort) S 







2012 Zhejiang Huahai 
Pharmaceutical v Fullgoal 
Fund Management* and Lion 
Fund Management 
 
Voting against the 




2013 Shanghai Jahwa v Fullgoal 
Fund Management*, 
Huitianfu Fund management 




to the articles of 
association and 





2013 Dashang v Fuguo Fund 
Management 
 




2013 China Merchant Bank v 






2014 Chongqing Taiji Industry v 
Baoying Fund Management 
 

























2014 Gongda Shouchuang v Zexi 
Investment Fund 
Proposing restructure 
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